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Abstract
We consider a combinatorial auction model where preferences of agents over bundles
of objects and payments need not be quasilinear. However, we restrict the preferences
of agents to be dichotomous. An agent with dichotomous preference partitions the set
of bundles of objects as acceptable and unacceptable, and at the same payment level, she
is indifferent between bundles in each class but strictly prefers acceptable to unaccept-
able bundles. We show that there is no Pareto efficient, dominant strategy incentive
compatible (DSIC), individually rational (IR) mechanism satisfying no subsidy if the
domain of preferences includes all dichotomous preferences. However, a generalization
of the VCG mechanism is Pareto efficient, DSIC, IR and satisfies no subsidy if the do-
main of preferences contains only positive income effect dichotomous preferences. We
show tightness of this result: adding any non-dichotomous preference (satisfying some
natural properties) to the domain of quasilinear dichotomous preferences brings back
the impossibility result.
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1 Introduction
The Vickrey-Clarke-Groves (VCG) mechanism (Vickrey, 1961; Clarke, 1971; Groves, 1973)
occupies a central role in mechanism design theory (specially, with private values). It satisfies
two fundamental desiderata: it is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC) and Pareto
efficient. We study a model of combinatorial auctions, where multiple objects are sold to
agents simultaneously, who may buy any bundle of objects. For such combinatorial auction
models, the VCG mechanism and its indirect implementations (like ascending price auctions)
have been popular. The VCG mechanism is also individually rational (IR) and satisfies no
subsidy (i.e., does not subsidize any agent) in these models.
Unfortunately, these desirable properties of the VCG mechanism critically rely on the fact
that agents have quasilinear preferences. While analytically convenient and a good approxi-
mation of actual preferences when payments involved are low, quasilinearity is a debatable
assumption in practice. For instance, consider an agent participating in a combinatorial auc-
tion for spectrum licenses, where agents often borrow from various investors at non-negligible
interest rates. Such borrowing naturally leads to a preference which is not quasilinear. Fur-
ther, income effects are ubiquitous in settings with non-negligible payments. For instance,
a bidder in a spectrum auction often needs to invest in telecom infrastrastructure to realize
the full value of spectrum. Higher payment in the auction will lead to lower investments in
infrastructure, and hence, a lower value for the spectrum.
This has initiated a small literature in mechanism design theory (discussed later in this
section and again in Section 4), where the quasilinearity assumption is relaxed to allow any
classical preference of the agent over consumption bundles: (bundle of objects, payment)
pairs.1 The main research question addressed in this literature is the following:
In combinatorial auction models, if agents have classical preferences, is it possible
to construct a “desirable” mechanism: a mechanism which inherits the DSIC,
Pareto efficiency, IR, and no subsidy properties of the VCG mechanism?
1.1 Dichotomous preferences
This paper contributes to this literature, focusing on the particular case in which agents’
preferences belong to a class of preferences, which we call dichotomous. If an agent has
1 Classical preferences assume mild continuity and monotonicity (in money and bundles of objects) prop-
erties of preferences.
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a dichotomous preference, she partitions the set of bundles of objects into acceptable and
unacceptable. If the payments for all the bundles of objects are the same, then an agent is
indifferent between her acceptable bundles of objects; she is also indifferent between unac-
ceptable bundles of objects; but she prefers every acceptable bundle to every unacceptable
bundle.
Such preferences, though restrictive, are found in many settings of interest. For instance,
consider the recent “incentive auction” done by the US Government (Leyton-Brown et al.,
2017). It involved a “reverse auction” phase where the broadcast licenses from existing
broadcasters were bought; a“forward auction”phase where buyers bought broadcast licenses;
and a clearing phase. The auction resulted in billions of dollars in revenue for US treasury
(Leyton-Brown et al., 2017). The theoretical analysis of the reverse auction phase was
done by Milgrom and Segal (2020), where they assume quasilinear preferences with “single-
minded” bidders, a specific kind of dichotomous preference where the bidder has a unique
acceptable bundle (a broadcast band in this case). In these auctions, a broadcaster had some
feasible frequency bands in which it can operate. Any of those feasible frequency bands were
“acceptable” and it was indifferent between them (since any of these frequencies allowed the
broadcaster to realize its full value of broadcast). This resulted in dichotomous preferences
of agents.2 Milgrom and Segal (2020) argue that the VCG mechanism is computationally
challenging in this setting and propose a simpler mechanism.
The assumption of dichotomous preferences seems natural in settings where a bidder is
acquiring some resources, and finds any bundle acceptable if it satisfies some requirements.
For instance, consider the following examples.
• Consider a scheduling problem, where a certain set of jobs (say, flights at the take-off
slots of an airport) need to be scheduled on a server. There are certain intervals where
each job is available and can be processed and other intervals are not acceptable. For
instance, a supplier bidding to supply to a firm’s production schedule can do so only
on some fixed interval of dates. So, certain dates are acceptable to it and others are
2Quoting Milgrom and Segal (2017), “Milgrom and Segal (2015) (hereafter MS) offer a theoretical analysis
which assumes that all bidders are single-station owners who know their station values and are “single-
minded”, that is, willing to bid only for a single option. This assumption is reasonable for commercial UHF
broadcasters that view VHF bands as ill-suited for their operations and for non-profit broadcasters that are
willing to move for compensation to a particular VHF band but that view going off-air as incompatible with
their mission.”
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not acceptable. A traveller is buying tickets between a pair of cities but find certain
dates acceptable for travel and realize value only on those dates.
• Consider a seller who is selling land to different buyers. The lands differ in size but are
homogeneous otherwise. Each buyer only demands a land of a fixed size. For instance,
suppose the Government is allocating land to firms to set up factories in a region, and
each firm needs a land of a fixed size to set up its factory. This means all the bundles
of land exceeding the size requirement are acceptable to a firm.
• Consider firms (data providers) buying paths on (data) networks (Babaioff et al., 2009)
- a firm is interested in sending data from node x to node y on a directed graph whose
edges are up for sale, and as long as a bundle of edges contain a path from x to y, it
is acceptable to the firm.
In all the examples above, if the payment involved are high, we can expect income ef-
fects, which will mean that agents do not have quasilinear preferences. One may also consider
the dichotomous preference restriction as a behavioural assumption, where the agent does
not consider computing values for each of the exponential number of bundles but classifies
the bundles as acceptable and unacceptable. Hence, they are easy to elicit even in com-
binatorial auction setting. Even with quasilinear preferences, the dichotomous restriction
poses interesting combinatorial challenges for computing the VCG outcome. This has led
to a large literature in computer science for looking at approximately desirable VCG-style
mechanisms (Babaioff et al., 2005, 2009; Lehmann et al., 2002; Ledyard, 2007; Milgrom and
Segal, 2014). Also related is the literature in matching and social choice theory (models
without payments), where dichotomous preferences have been widely studied (Bogomolnaia
and Moulin, 2004; Bogomolnaia et al., 2005; Bade, 2015).
1.2 Summary and intuition of results
We show that if the domain of preferences contains all dichotomous classical preferences,
there is no desirable mechanism. However, a natural generalization of the VCG mechanism
to classical preferences, which we call the generalized VCG (GVCG) mechanism, is desirable
if the domain contains only positive income effect dichotomous preferences. In other words,
when normal goods are sold, the GVCG mechanism is desirable. Further, the GVCG mecha-
nism is the unique desirable mechanism in any domain of positive income effect dichotomous
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preferences if it contains the quasilinear dichotomous preferences. The GVCG mechanism
allocates the goods in a way such that the collective willingness to pay of all the bidders
is maximized. Classical preferences imply that willingness to pay for a bundle of objects
depends on the payment level. Thus, it is not clear what the counterpart of “valuation”
of a bundle of objects is in this setting. Our generalized VCG is defined by treating the
willingness to pay at zero payment as the “valuation” of a bundle and then defining the VCG
outcome with respect to these valuations, i.e., the allocation maximizes the sum of agents’
valuations and each agent pays her externality.
The intuition for these results is the following. The GVCG mechanism allocates the
goods in a way that maximizes the collective willingness to pay of all the bidders. In fact,
with enough richness in the domain, every desirable mechanism must allocate objects like the
GVCG mechanism at certain profiles. Individual rationality implies that winning bidders pay
an amount less than their willingness to pay. So, winning makes a winning bidder wealthier.
With dichotomous preferences, the payments in the GVCG mechanism can be quite low.
If bidders have negative income effect, then their willingness to sell (i.e., the compensating
amount needed to make a winning bidder lose her bundle of objects) is lower than their
willingness to pay. This creates ex-post trading opportunities and the GVCG mechanism is
no longer efficient. On the other hand, with positive income effect, the willingness to sell of
winning bidders is higher than their willingness to pay and the GVCG mechanism is efficient.
Our positive result is tight: we get back impossibility in any domain containing quasilin-
ear dichotomous preferences and at least one more positive income effect non-dichotomous
preference (satisfying some extra reasonable conditions). Such an additional preference may
be a unit-demand preference, where the agent is interested in at most one object (Demange
and Gale, 1985). To get an intuition for this result, suppose we consider a domain which
contains all quasilinear dichotomous preferences and one unit-demand positive income effect
preference. We know that the GVCG mechanism may not be strategy-proof in the domain of
unit-demand preferences if agents have income effects (Morimoto and Serizawa, 2015). But,
we know that in the quasilinear domain with dichotomous preferences, the GVCG mech-
anism is the unique desirable mechanism. With two agents having positive income effect
unit-demand preference and others having quasilinear dichotomous preference, we show that
the outcome in a desirable mechanism, if it existed, would still have to be the outcome of
the GVCG mechanism. As a result, the agents with positive income effect unit-demand
preferences could manipulate at such preference profiles. This negative result not only es-
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tablishes the tightness of our positive result, but also helps to illuminate the bigger picture
of possibility and impossibility domains without quasilinearity.
We briefly connect our results to some relevant results from the literature. A detailed
literature survey is given in Section 4. Saitoh and Serizawa (2008) was the first paper to
define the generalized VCG mechanism for the single object auction model. They show that
the generalized VCG mechanism is desirable in their model even if preferences have negative
income effect. This is in contrast to our model, where we get impossibility with negative
income effect preferences but the generalized VCG mechanism is desirable with positive
income effect.
When we go from single object to multiple object combinatorial auctions, the generalized
VCG may fail to be DSIC without quasilinear preferences. For instance, Demange and Gale
(1985) consider a combinatorial auction model where multiple heterogenous objects are sold
but each agent demands at most one object. In this model, the generalized VCG is no longer
DSIC. However, Demange and Gale (1985) propose a different mechanism (based on the idea
of market-clearing prices), which is desirable.
When agents can demand more than one object in a combinatorial auction model with
multiple heterogeneous objects, Kazumura and Serizawa (2016) show that a desirable mech-
anism may not exist - this result requires certain richness of the domain of preferences which
is violated by our dichotomous preference model. Similarly, Baisa (2020) shows that in the
homogeneous objects sale case, if agents demand multiple units, then a desirable mechanism
may not exist – he requires slightly different axioms than our desirability axioms.
These results point to a conjecture that when agents demand multiple objects in a com-
binatorial auction model, a desirable mechanism may not exist. Since ours is a combinatorial
auction model where agents can consume multiple objects, an impossibility result might not
seem surprising. However, dichotomous preferences are somewhat close to the single object
model preference. So, it is not clear which intuition dominates. Our impossibility result with
dichotomous preferences complement the earlier impossibility results, showing that the multi-
demand intuition goes through if we include all possible dichotomous preferences. However,
what is surprising is that we recover the desirability of the generalized VCG mechanism
with positive income effect dichotomous preferences. This shows that not all multi-demand
combinatorial auction models without quasilinearity are impossibility domains.
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2 Preliminaries
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be the set of agents and M be a set of m objects. Let B be the set
of all subsets of M . We will refer to elements in B as bundles (of objects). A seller (or a
planner) is selling/allocating bundles from B to agents in N using payments. We introduce
the notion of classical preferences and type spaces corresponding to them below.
2.1 Classical Preferences
Each agent has preference over possible outcomes, which are pairs of the form (A, t), where
A ∈ B is a bundle and t ∈ R is the amount paid by the agent. Let Z = B × R denote the
set of all outcomes. A preference Ri of agent i over Z is a complete transitive preference
relation with strict part denoted by Pi and indifference part denoted by Ii. This formulation
of preference is very general and can capture wealth effects. For instance, varying levels
of transfers will correspond to varying levels of wealth and this can be captured by our
preference over Z.
We restrict attention to the following class of preferences.
Definition 1 Preference Ri of agent i over Z is classical if it satisfies
1. Monotonicity. for each A,A′ ∈ B with A′ ⊆ A and for each t, t′ ∈ R with t′ > t, the
following hold: (i) (A, t) Pi (A, t
′) and (ii) (A, t) Ri (A′, t).
2. Continuity. for each Z ∈ Z, the upper contour set {Z ′ ∈ Z : Z ′ Ri Z} and the lower
contour set {Z ′ ∈ Z : Z Ri Z ′} are closed.
3. Finiteness. for each t ∈ R and for each A,A′ ∈ B, there exist t′, t′′ ∈ R such that
(A′, t′) Ri (A, t) and (A, t) Ri (A′, t′′).
Restricting attention to such classical preferences is standard in mechanism design litera-
ture without quasilinearity (Demange and Gale, 1985; Baisa, 2020; Morimoto and Serizawa,
2015). The monotonicity conditions mentioned above are quite natural. The continuity and
finiteness are technical conditions needed to ensure nice structure of the indifference vectors.
A quasilinear preference is always classical, where indifference vectors are “parallel”. Notice
that the monotonicity condition requires a free-disposal property: at a fixed payment level,
every bundle is weakly preferred to every other bundle which is a subset of it. All our results
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continue to hold even if we relax this free-disposal property to require that at a fixed payment
level, every bundle be weakly preferred to the empty bundle only.
Given a classical preference Ri, the willingness to pay (WP) of agent i at t for bundle
A is defined as the unique solution x to the following equation:
(A, t+ x) Ii (∅, t).
We denote this solution as WP (A, t;Ri). The following fact is immediate from monotonicity,
continuity, and finiteness.
Fact 1 For every classical preference Ri, for every A ∈ B and for every t ∈ R, WP (A, t;Ri)
is a unique non-negative real number.
For quasilinear preference, WP (A, t;Ri) is independent of t and represents the valuation for
bundle A.
Another way to represent a classical preference is by a collection of indifference vectors.
Fix a classical preference Ri. Then, by definition, for every t ∈ R and for every A ∈ B, agent
i with classical preference Ri will be indifferent between the following outcomes:
(∅, t) Ii (A, t+WP (A, t;Ri)).
Figure 1 shows a representation of classical preference for three objects {a, b, c}. The
horizontal lines correspond to payment levels for each of the bundles. Hence, these lines
are the set of all outcomes Z – the space between these eight lines have no meaning and
are kept only for ease of illustration. As we go to the right along any of these lines, the
outcomes become worse since the payment (payment made by the agent) increases. Figure
1 shows eight points, each corresponding to a unique bundle and a payment level for that
bundle. These points are joined to show that the agent is indifferent between these outcomes
for a classical preference. Classical preference implies that all the points to the left of this
indifference vector are better than these outcomes and all the points to the right of this
indifference vector are worse than these outcomes. Indeed, every classical preference can be
represented by a collection of an infinite number of such indifference vectors.
2.2 Domains and mechanisms
A bundle allocation is an ordered sequence of objects (A1, . . . , An), where Ai denotes the
bundle allocated to agent i, such that for each Ai, Aj ∈ B, we have Ai ∩ Aj = ∅ - note that
8
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bundles
WP (fa; cg; t;Ri)
t
An indifference vec-
tor for Ri
Figure 1: Representation of classical preferences
Ai can be equal to ∅ for any i in an object allocation. Let X denote the set of all bundle
allocations.
An outcome profile ((A1, t1), . . . , (An, tn)) is a collection of n outcomes such that (A1, . . . , An)
is the bundle allocation and ti denotes the payment made by agent i. An outcome profile
((A1, t1), . . . , (An, tn)) is Pareto efficient at R ≡ (R1, . . . , Rn), if there does not exist an-
other outcome profile ((A′1, t
′
1), . . . , (A
′
n, t
′
n)) such that
1. for each i ∈ N, (A′i, t′i) Ri (Ai, ti),
2.
∑
i∈N t
′
i ≥
∑
i∈N ti,
with one of the inequalities strictly satisfied. The first relation says that each agent i prefers
(A′i, t
′
i) to (Ai, ti). The second relation requires that the seller is not spending money to make
everyone better off. Without the second relation, we can always improve any outcome profile
by subsidizing the agents.3
A domain or type space is any subset of classical preferences. A typical domain of
preferences will be denoted by T . A mechanism is a pair (f,p), where f : T n → X and
3Our efficiency definition says that the agents and the designer cannot improve using an outcome profile,
which may involve negative payments. Later, we impose no-subsidy as an axiom for our mechanism. The
way to think about this is that Pareto efficient improvements are outside the mechanism and may involve one
agent or the designer “buying” a bundle of objects from another agent by compensating (negative payment)
her.
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p ≡ (p1, . . . , pn) is a collection of payment rules with each pi : T n → R. Here, f is the
bundle allocation rule and pi is the payment rule of agent i. We denote the bundle allocated
to agent i at type profile R by fi(R) ∈ B in the bundle allocation rule f .
We require the following properties from a mechanism, which we term desirable.
Definition 2 (Desirable mechanisms) A mechanism (f,p) is desirable if
1. it is dominant strategy incentive compatible (DSIC): for all i ∈ N , for all
R−i ∈ T n−1, and for all Ri, R′i ∈ T , we have(
fi(R), pi(R)
)
Ri
(
fi(R
′
i, R−i), pi(R
′
i, R−i)
)
.
2. it is Pareto efficient:
(
(f1(R), p1(R)), . . . , (fn(R), pn(R))
)
is Pareto efficient at R,
for all R ∈ T n.
3. it is individually rational (IR): for all R ∈ T n and for all i ∈ N ,(
fi(R), pi(R)
)
Ri (∅, 0).
4. satisfies no subsidy: for all R ∈ T n and for all i ∈ N ,
pi(R) ≥ 0.
We will explore domains where a desirable mechanism exists. DSIC, Pareto efficiency, and
IR are standard constraints in mechanism design. No subsidy is debatable. Our motivation
for considering it as desirable stems from the fact that most auction formats in practice and
the VCG mechanism satisfy it. It also discourages fake buyers from participating in the
mechanism.
2.3 A motivating example
In this section, we provide an example to give some intuition for one of our main results.
Example 1
Consider a setting with three agents N = {1, 2, 3}, and two objects M = {a, b}. We are
interested in a preference profile where agents 2 and 3 have identical preference: R2 = R3 =
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R0. In particular, all non-empty bundles have the same willingness to pay according to R0
and satisfy
WP ({a, b}, t;R0) = WP ({a}, t;R0) = WP ({b}, t;R0) = 2 + 3t,
for t > −1
2
. We are silent about the willingness to pay below −1
2
, but it can be taken to be
0.5. We will only consider payments t > −1
2
for this example. At preference R0, we have
({a, b}, 2 + 4t) I0 ({b}, 2 + 4t) I0 ({a}, 2 + 4t) I0 (∅, t),
for all t > −1
2
. Hence, as t increases, bundle {a} (or {b} or {a, b}) will require more payment
to be indifferent to (∅, t). We term this negative income effect.
{a} {b} {a, b}
WP (·, 0;R1) 0 0 3.9
WP (·, 0;R2 = R0) 2 2 2
WP (·, 0;R3 = R0) 2 2 2
Table 1: A profiles of preferences with M = {a, b}, N = {1, 2, 3}.
Agent 1 has quasilinear preference with a value of 3.9 for bundle {a, b}; value zero (or,
arbitrarily close to zero) for bundle {a} and bundle {b}, and value of bundle ∅ is normalized
to zero. We denote this preference as R1. The willingness to pay at zero payment for these
preferences are shown in Table 1.
Suppose (f,p) is a desirable mechanism defined on a (rich enough) type space T con-
taining the preference profile R ≡ (R1, R2 = R0, R3 = R0). Notice that the value of {a, b}
for agent 1 is 3.9 but WP ({a}, 0;R2) +WP ({b}, 0;R3) = 4. Hence, a consequence of Pareto
efficiency, individual rationality, and no subsidy is that f1(R) = ∅.4 Then, without loss of
generality, agent 2 gets bundle {a} and agent 3 gets bundle {b} due to Pareto efficiency.
Next, we can pin down the payments of agents at R. Since agent 1 gets ∅, her payment
must be zero by IR and no subsidy. Now, pretend as if agents 2 and 3 have quasilinear
preference with valuations equal to their willingness to pay at zero payment (see Table 1).
Then, the VCG mechanism would charge them their externalities, which is equal to 1.9 for
4This follows from the following reasoning. Individual rationality and no subsidy imply that agents who
are not allocated any object pay zero. Hence, any outcome where agent 1 is given both the objects can be
Pareto improved.
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both the agents. If the type space T is sufficiently rich (in a sense, we make precise later),
DSIC will still require that p2(R) = p3(R) = 1.9 (a precise argument is given in the proof of
Theorem 1).
The negative income effect of R0 makes the Pareto improvement possible in this example.
The maximum payment we can extract from agent 1 is 3.9. Hence, to collect more payment
than the VCG outcome, we can pay a maximum of 0.1(= 3.9 − 3.8) to agents 2 and 3. If
the preference R0 was quasilinear, agents 2 and 3 would have required a compensation of
0.1 each to be indifferent between not getting any objects and the VCG outcome. Due to
negative income effect, agents 2 and 3 can be made to improve from their VCG outcome
by paying them much lower amounts. This in turn enables us to Pareto dominate the VCG
outcome.
To be precise, the following outcome vector Pareto dominates the outcome of the mech-
anism at R:
z1 := ({a, b}, 3.9), z2 := (∅,−0.025), z3 := (∅,−0.025).
To see why, note that (a) sum of payments in z is 3.85 > p2(R) + p3(R) = 3.8; (b) agent
1 is indifferent between z1 and (∅, 0); (c) agents 2 and 3 are also indifferent between their
outcomes in the mechanism and z since (∅,−0.025) I0 ({a}, 1.9) (because WP ({a}, t;R0) =
2 + 3t for all t > −0.5).
It is important to note that R1 having high value on {a, b} and (almost) zero value on
all other bundles played a crucial role in determining payments of agents, and hence, in the
impossibility. Indeed, if agent 1 also had equal willingness to pay on some smaller bundle,
then the example will not work.5 This motivates the class of preferences we study in the
next section. ♦
2.4 Dichotomous preferences
We turn our focus on a subset of classical preferences which we call dichotomous. The
dichotomous preferences can be described by: (a) a collection of bundles, which we call the
5 If the willingness to pay of agent 1 is 3.9 on {a} or {b}, then her preference will satisfy the unit demand
property (for a formal definition, see Section 3.3). Preference R0 also satisfies the unit demand property. It
is known that if agents have unit demand preferences, a desirable mechanism exists, even if such preferences
have negative income effect (Demange and Gale, 1985).
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acceptable bundles, and (b) a willingness to pay function, which only depends on the payment
level. Formally, it is defined as follows.
Definition 3 A classical preference Ri of agent i is dichotomous if there exists a non-
empty set of bundles ∅ 6= Si ⊆ (B \ {∅}) and a willingness to pay (WP) map wi : R→ R++
such that for every t ∈ R,
WP (A, t;Ri) =
{
wi(t) ∀ A ∈ Si
0 ∀ A ∈ B \ Si.
In this case, we refer to Si as the collection of acceptable bundles.
The interpretation of the dichotomous preference is that, given same price (payment) for all
the bundles, the agent is indifferent between the bundles in Si. Similarly, she is indifferent
between the bundles in B \ Si, but it strictly prefers a bundle in Si to a bundle outside
it. Hence, a dichotomous preference can be succinctly represented by a pair (wi,Si), where
wi : R→ R++ is a WP map and ∅ 6= Si ⊆ (B \ {∅}) is the set of acceptable bundles.
By our monotonicity requirement (free-disposal) of classical preference, for every S, T ∈
B, we have [
S ⊆ T, S ∈ Si
]
⇒
[
T ∈ Si
]
.
Hence, a dichotomous preference can be described by wi and a minimal set of bundles Smini
such that
Si := {T ∈ B : S ⊆ T for some S ∈ Smini }.
Figure 2 shows two indifference vectors of a dichotomous preference. The figure shows
that the bundles {a}, {a, c}, {a, b} and {a, b, c} are acceptable but others are not.
We will denote the domain of all dichotomous preferences as D, where each preference
in D for agent i is described by a wi map and a collection of minimal bundles Smini . A
dichotomous domain is any subset of dichotomous preferences.
For some of our results, we will need a particular type of dichotomous preference.
Definition 4 A dichotmous preference Ri ≡ (Smini , wi) is called a single-minded pref-
erence if |Smini | = 1.
13
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Figure 2: A dichotomous preference
An agent having a single-minded dichotomous preference has a unique bundle of objects
and all its supersets as acceptable bundles. Let Dsingle denote the set of all single-minded
preferences. Single-minded preferences are well-studied in the algorithmic game theory lit-
erature (Lehmann et al., 2002; Babaioff et al., 2005, 2009). They were also central in the
recent analysis of US incentive auction (Milgrom and Segal, 2020). Our main negative result
will be for domains containing Dsingle. Establishing a negative result on domains containing
Dsingle implies a negative result on domains containing D since Dsingle ( D.
Before concluding this section, we briefly discuss how dichotomous preferences are similar
to some other kinds of preferences in the literature. In the single object model, the prefer-
ences are clearly dichotomous, where there is no uncertainty about the acceptable bundles.
Similarly, consider the unit demand preferences studied in Demange and Gale (1985); Mori-
moto and Serizawa (2015). A preference Ri is a unit demand preference if for every S ∈ B
and every t ∈ R, we have WP (S, t;Ri) = maxa∈SWP ({a}, t;Ri). Now, suppose the objects
are homogeneous in the following sense: WP ({a}, t;Ri) = WP ({b}, t;Ri) for all a, b ∈ M
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and for all t ∈ R. It is clear that a unit demand preference Ri over homogeneous objects is
a dichotomous preference, where Smini consists of singleton bundles. If the objects are not
homogeneous, the unit demand preferences are not dichotmous since the willingness to pay
of different objects may be different.
3 The results
We describe our main results in this section.
3.1 An impossibility result
We start with our main negative result: if the domain consists of all single-minded prefer-
ences, then there is no desirable mechanism. This generalizes the intuition we demonstrated
in the example in Section 2.3.
Theorem 1 (Impossibility) Suppose T ⊇ Dsingle (i.e., the domain contains all single-
minded preferences), n ≥ 3, and m ≥ 2. Then, no desirable mechanism exists in T n.
The proof of this theorem and all other proofs are relegated to an appendix at the end.
The proof formalizes the sketch given in the example in Section 2.3. The main idea of the
proof is that if a desirable mechanism exists in Dsingle, it has to define outcomes at all single-
minded preference profiles, which includes an n-agent and m-object version of the preference
profile discussed in Section 2.3. The challenge is to show that any desirable mechanism at
that profile must coincide with the outcome of a generalized VCG mechanism (where agents
pay their “externalities”). Once this is shown, the rest of the proof is similar to the discussion
in Section 2.3.
As discussed in the introduction, Theorem 1 adds to a small list of papers that have
established such negative results in other combinatorial auction problems. Notice that the
domain T may contain preferences that are not dichotomous or it may be equal to D, the
set of all dichotomous preferences.
The conditions m ≥ 2 and n ≥ 3 are both necessary: if m = 1, we know that a desirable
mechanism exists (Saitoh and Serizawa, 2008); if n = 2, the mechanism that we propose
next is desirable – see Proposition 1 and discussions after it.
Definition 5 The generalized Vickrey-Clarke-Groves mechanism with loser’s pay-
ment tL (GVCG-tL), denoted as (f
vcg,tL ,pvcg,tL), is defined as follows: for every profile of
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preferences R,
f vcg,tL(R) ∈ arg max
A∈X
∑
i∈N
WP (Ai, tL;Ri)
pvcg,tLi (R) = tL + max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (f vcg,tLj (R), tL;Rj).
We refer to the GVCG-0 mechanism as the GVCG mechanism.
The GVCG class of mechanisms is a natural generalization of the VCG mechanism to
our setting without quasilinearity. Note that the current definition does not use anything
about dichotomous preferences. It computes the “externality” of every agent with respect
to a reference transfer level tL. This transfer level tL corresponds to the payment by any
agent who does not win any non-empty bundle of objects in the mechanism (such an agent
has zero externality). The additional term tL in the payment expression ensures that when
we use tL as the reference transfer level to compute externalities, we maintain incentive
compatibility in the dichotomous domain. In the quasilinear domain, the reference transfer
level does not matter as the willingness to pay does not change with reference transfer:
WP (S, tL, Ri) = WP (S, 0, Ri) for each S, if Ri is a quasilinear preference.
Theorem 1 implies that the GVCG mechanism is not desirable. Indeed, no GVCG mech-
anism can be DSIC in an arbitrary combinatorial auction domain without quasilinearity. For
instance, Morimoto and Serizawa (2015) show that there is a unique desirable mechanism
in the domain of “unit-demand” (where agents have demand for at most one object) pref-
erences, and it is not a GVCG mechanism. We show that the GVCG mechanism is DSIC,
individually rational, and satisfies no subsidy in any dichotomous preference domain.
Proposition 1 Consider the GVCG-tL mechanism for some tL ∈ R, defined on an arbi-
trary dichotomous domain T ⊆ D. Then, the following are true.
1. The GVCG-tL mechanism is DSIC.
2. The GVCG-tL mechanism is individually rational if tL ≤ 0.
3. The GVCG-tL mechanism satisfies individual rationality and no subsidy if tL = 0.
4. The GVCG-tL mechanism is Pareto efficient if n = 2.
5. The GVCG-tL mechanism is not Pareto efficient if n > 2,m > 1, and T ⊇ Dsingle.
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We explain below why the GVCG class of mechanisms are compatible with Pareto ef-
ficiency when n = 2 but not compatible when n > 2. For simplicity, we assume that
preferences of agents are single-minded, i.e., the domain is Dsingle. We consider various cases.
One object (m = 1). It is well known that the GVCG mechanism is Pareto efficient if
m = 1 (Saitoh and Serizawa, 2008). Note that for m = 1, every preference is single-minded.
The GVCG mechanism allocates the object to an agent k with the highest WP at 0, i.e.,
wk(0) = maxi∈N wi(0). All agents except agent k pay zero and agent k pays maxi 6=k wi(0).
This outcome is always Pareto efficient. The main reason for this is that there is only one
object, and any new outcome can only give this object to one agent (may be the same or
another agent). Take any such outcome z ≡ (z1, . . . , zn) and assume for contradiction that
it Pareto dominates the GVCG outcome. If agent k continues to get the object in zk also,
her payment cannot be more than maxi 6=k wi(0). Further, payments of other agents cannot
be more than zero. As a result, total payment cannot be more than maxi 6=k wi(0). Similarly,
if any other agent j 6= k receives the object in z, then her payment cannot be more than
wj(0) (else, she will prefer the GVCG outcome of getting nothing and paying zero). Further,
in this case, since agent k does not receive the object in z, her payment will be non-positive.
As a result, the total payment cannot be more than maxi 6=k wi(0). In fact, the total payment
in z in both the cases will be strictly less than the GVCG payments if any agent strictly
improves, which is a contradiction.
Two agents (n = 2) but arbitrary m. Since preferences of agents are single-minded, at
every preference profile the acceptable bundles of each agent i are supersets of some Si ∈ B.
Since there are two agents, we have only two cases to consider: (i) S1 ∩ S2 = ∅ and (ii)
S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅. Intuitively, in the first case, the two agents are not competing against each
other. Pareto efficiency requires us to allocate each agent i ∈ {1, 2} her acceptable bundle
Si. The GVCG mechanism charges zero payment to the agents. Clearly, this cannot be
Pareto dominated. In the second case, the two agents compete against each other like the
single object case. This is because S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅ means exactly one agent can be assigned an
acceptable bundle. In fact the allocation and payment in the GVCG mechanism for this case
mirrors the single object case: the agent with the higher WP at 0 gets her acceptable bundle
and pays the willingness to pay of the other agent. The fact that this outcome cannot be
Pareto dominated follows an argument similar to the m = 1 case. Summarizing, if there are
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two agents, independent of the number of objects, the Pareto efficiency requirement is very
similar to the single object case. Hence, the GVCG mechanism remains compatible with
Pareto efficiency.
More than two agents and more than one object (n > 2,m > 1). With more
than two agents and more than one object, the Pareto efficiency requirement is no longer like
the single object case. To understand, let us consider Example 1 (see Table 1). The GVCG
mechanism allocates objects a and b to agents 2 and 3 but charges them low payments (1.9
each). This is akin to low payments in the VCG mechanism as documented in Ausubel
and Milgrom (2006).6 In our example, even though agent 1 is not allocated any object,
she has high enough willingness to pay for the bundle of objects – with one object, if the
payment of the winning agent is low, then the willingness to pay of all losing agents is also
low. With negative income effect, agents 2 and 3 feel “wealthier” after getting the objects at
low payments. So, their “willingness to sell” amount is low. Hence, it is easier to compensate
them. With agent 1 having a high enough willingness to pay (3.9), a Pareto improving trade
is thus possible. Such a Pareto improving trade is not possible if agents 2 and 3 have positive
income effect preferences. This is because with positive income effect, the“willingness to sell”
amount is higher than the willingness to pay.
3.2 Positive income effect and possibility
Proposition 1 and Theorem 1 point out that the GVCG is not Pareto efficient in the entire
dichotomous domain. A closer look at the proof of Theorem 1 (and Example 1) reveals that
the impossibility is driven by a particular kind of dichotomous preferences: the ones where
the willingness to pay of an agent increases with payment. We term such preferences negative
income effect.
A standard definition of positive income effect will say that as income rises, a preferred
bundle becomes “more preferred”. We do not model income explicitly, but our preferences
implicitly account for income. So, if payment decreases from t to t′, the income level of the
agent increases implicitly. As a result, she is willing to pay more for his acceptable bundles
at t′ than at t. Thus, positive income effect captures a reasonable (and standard) restriction
6They point out that when there are at least two objects and at least three agents, the VCG mechanism
outcome may not lie in the “core” of the associated game if objects are complements. This in turn results in
low payments. The dichotomous preferences exhibit extreme form of complementarity.
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on preferences of the agents.
Definition 6 A dichotomous preference Ri ≡ (wi,Si) satisfies positive income effect if
for all t > t′, we have wi(t) ≤ wi(t′).
A dichotomous domain of preferences T satisfies positive income effect if every preference
in T satisfies positive income effect.
As an illustration, the indifference vectors shown in Figure 2 cannot be part of a dichotomous
preference satisfying positive income effect – we see that tˆ > t but wi(tˆ) > wi(t). The
preference R0 in Example 1 also violated positive income effect. A quasilinear preference
(where wi(t) = wi(t
′) for all t, t′) always satisfies positive income effect, and the GVCG
mechanism is known to be a desirable mechanism in this domain. We show below that the
GVCG mechanism is Pareto efficient if the domain contains preferences that satisfy positive
income effect. Before stating the result, let us reconsider Example 1 and see why the GVCG
mechanism becomes desirable with positive income effect.
Example 2
We revisit Example 1 but with an important difference: the preferences of agents 2 and 3
now satisfy positive income effect. So, we have three agents N = {1, 2, 3} and two objects
M = {a, b}. As in Example 1, agent 1 has single-minded quasilinear preference R1 with
valuation 3.9 on the unique acceptable bundle {a, b}. All the bundles are acceptable bundles
for agents 2 and 3. But their preference is now R̂0 which satisfies positive income effect.
However, similar to Example 1, we have ŵ(0) = 2. Figure 3 shows two indifference vectors
of R̂0. Since R̂0 satisfies positive income effect, we have ŵ(t) > ŵ(0), where t < 0.
The GVCG outcome does not change from Example 1 at this profile: agent 2 gets object
a and agent 3 gets object b with payments pvcg1 = 0, p
vcg
2 = p
vcg
3 = 1.9. To Pareto dominate
this outcome, we need to give both the objects to agent 1.
{a} {b} {a, b}
WP (·, 0;R1) 0 0 3.9
WP (·, 0;R2 = R̂0) 2 2 2
WP (·, 0;R3 = R̂0) 2 2 2
Table 2: A profiles of preferences with M = {a, b}, N = {1, 2, 3}.
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Figure 3: Possibility with positive income effect
Now, the GVCG outcome to agent 2 is ({a}, 1.9) and, by Table 2 (see Figure 3 also),
({a}, 2) Î0 (∅, 0). If ({a}, 1.9) Î0 (∅, t), then by positive income effect t < −0.1. A pictorial
description of the indifference vectors of R̂0 for these transfer amounts are shown in Figure
3. This means that if agent 2 is not given any object, the total compensation required for
her alone will be more than 0.1. Since agent 3 needs to be compensated too and the total
revenue collected in the VCG outcome is 3.8, we need to charge more than 3.9 to agent 1 to
Pareto dominate the VCG outcome. This is impossible since the value of agent 1 for both
the objects is only 3.9. ♦
The intuition in this example generalizes. The main idea is that the GVCG mechanism
allocates goods in a way that maximizes the collective willingness to pays (at zero) of the
winning bidders. IR implies that the winning bidders pay a price less than their willingness to
pay for their winning bundles. Thus, winning essentially makes the bidders feel “wealthier”.
Positive income effect then implies that their “willingness to sell” after the auction exceeds
the willingness to pay before the auction. This rules out any Pareto improving trades7.
Our next result says that the impossibility in Theorem 1 is overturned in any domain of
dichotomous preferences satisfying positive income effect.
7We are grateful to an anonymous referee for this intuition. Baisa and Burkett (2019) give similar intuition
in a single object auction model to establish a mapping between non-quasilinear and quasilinear economies.
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Theorem 2 (Possibility) The GVCG mechanism is desirable on any dichotomous domain
satisfying positive income effect.
Theorem 2 can be interpreted to be a generalization of the well-known result that the
VCG mechanism is desirable in the quasilinear domain. Indeed, we know that if the domain
of preferences is the set of all quasilinear preferences, then standard revenue equivalence
result (which holds in the quasilinear domain) implies that the VCG mechanism is the only
desirable mechanism. Though we do not have a revenue equivalence result, we show below
a similar uniqueness result of the GVCG mechanism. For this, we first remind ourselves of
the definition of a quasilinear preference. A dichotomous preference (wi,Si) is quasilinear
if for every t, t′ ∈ R, we have wi(t) = wi(t′). We denote by DQL the set of all dichotomous
quasilinear preferences. This leads to a characterization of the GVCG mechanism.
Theorem 3 (Uniqueness) Suppose the domain of preferences T is a dichotomous domain
satisfying positive income effect and contains DQL. Let (f,p) be a mechanism defined on
T n. Then, the following statements are equivalent.
1. (f,p) is a desirable mechanism.
2. (f,p) is the GVCG mechanism.
We reiterate that the GVCG is known to fail DSIC with non-quasilinear preferences
if agents demand multiple objects. So, Theorems 2 and 3 show that under dichotomous
classical preferences with positive income effect, we recover the desirability of the GVCG
mechanism.
3.3 Tightness of results
In this section, we investigate if the positive results in the previous sections continue to hold
if the domain includes (positive income effect) non-dichotomous preferences. In particular,
we investigate the consequences of adding a non-dichotomous preference satisfying positive
income effect and some other reasonable properties (we precisely define them later in the
section). Both these conditions are natural properties to impose on preferences. Our re-
sults below can be summarized as follows: if we take the set of all quasilinear dichotomous
preferences and add any non-dichotomous preference satisfying the above two conditions,
then no desirable mechanism can exist in such a type space. As corollaries, we uncover new
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type spaces where no desirable mechanism can exist with non-quasilinear preferences, and
establish the role of dichotomous preferences in such type spaces. Before we formally state
the result, we give an example to show why we should expect such an impossibility result.
{a} {b} {a, b}
WP (·, 0;R1) 0 0 5
WP (·, 0;R2 = R0) 3 4 4
WP (·, 0;R3 = R0) 3 4 4
WP (·, 0;R′2) 0 4 4
Table 3: Two profiles of preferences with M = {a, b}, N = {1, 2, 3}.
Example 3
We consider an example with two object M := {a, b} and three agents N := {1, 2, 3}.
We will require the following preferences of the agents. The preference R1 of agent 1 is
quasilinear and the corresponding values for bundles of objects is shown in Table 3. It is
clear that R1 is a single-minded preference. We have two preferences of agent 2: R2 = R0
and R′2. Preference R0 is not quasilinear, but it satisfies positive income effect (decreasing
prices by the same amount of two indifferent consumption bundles lead the agents to strictly
prefer the costlier object): ({b}, 4) I0 ({a}, 3) and ({b}, 2) P0 ({a}, 1). This is shown in
Figure 4, where we show some indifference vectors of R0. Note that the other indifference
vectors of R0 can be constructed such that it satisfies the unit demand property and positive
income effect. Preference R′2 is a quasilinear single-minded preference with {b} and {a, b} as
acceptable bundles and value 4. Finally, preference R3 of agent 3 is also R0.
We argue that the GVCG mechanism containing all quasilinear dichotomous preferences
and R0 is not DSIC. So, our domain is T = DQL ∪ {R0}. We will look at two preference
profiles: (R1, R2, R3) and (R1, R
′
2, R3). At the preference profile (R1, R2, R3), agents 2 and
3 should get objects from {a, b} according to GVCG. Since they have identical preferences,
we break the tie by giving object a to agent 2 and object b to agent 3: f vcg1 (R1, R2, R3) =
{a}, f vcg2 (R1, R2, R3) = {b}.8 The payment of agent 2 is pvcg2 (R1, R2, R3) = 1.
8 The example can be modified to work if the tie is broken by giving object b to agent 2 and object a to
agent 3.
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Figure 4: Positive income effect preference of agents 2 and 3.
Now, consider the preference profile (R1, R
′
2, R3). Here, since agent 2 has only {b} and
{a, b} in her acceptable bundle, her GVCG outcome changes: f vcg2 (R1, R′2, R3) = {b} and
pvcg2 (R1, R
′
2, R3) = 2. In other words, the externality of agent 2 changes from 1 at preference
profile (R1, R2, R3) to 2 at (R1, R
′
2, R3).
If R2 was a quasilinear preference, then agent 2 would have been indifferent between
({a}, 1) and ({b}, 2). But since R2 = R0 satisfies positive income effect (see Figure 4),
({b}, 2) P2 ({a}, 1). This shows that with positive income effect, agent 2 can manipulate in
the GVCG mechanism in this domain.
This is a general problem. We formalize this in Theorem 4. We show in the proof of
Theorem 4 that any desirable mechanism in such a domain must have the GVCG outcomes
at these profiles, and this will lead to manipulation by the agent having positive income
effect.
It is crucial thatWP ({a}, 0;R0) < WP ({b}, 0;R0) for this manipulation to happen in this
example. If WP ({a}, 0;R0) = WP ({b}, 0;R0) = 4, then R0 can be a dichotomous preference
(i.e., besides the indifference vector shown in Table 3, we can construct other indifference
vectors such that it is a dichotomous preference). We know that the GVCG mechanism is
DSIC in such domains. Indeed, in that case, the externality of agent 2 remains unchanged
across profiles (R1, R2, R3) and (R1, R
′
2, R3). In other words, we have p
vcg
2 (R1, R2, R3) =
pvcg2 (R1, R
′
2, R3) = 1. So, no manipulation is possible by agent 2 across these two preference
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profiles.9
♦
We formalize the intuition in Example 3 now. We consider a preference where an agent
can demand multiple heterogeneous objects. We require that at least two objects are het-
erogeneous in the following sense.
Definition 7 A preference Ri satisfies heterogenous demand if there exists a, b ∈M ,
WP ({a}, 0;Ri) 6= WP ({b}, 0;Ri).
Heterogeneous demand requires that for some pair of objects, the WP at 0 must be different
for them. If objects are not the same (i.e., not homogeneous), then we should expect this
condition to hold. We can provide an analogous tightness result if objects are homogeneous.10
Besides the heterogeneous demand, we will impose two natural conditions on preferences.
The first condition is a mild form of substitutability condition.
Definition 8 A preference Ri satisfies strict decreasing marginal WP if for every
a, b ∈M ,
WP ({a}, 0;Ri) +WP ({b}, 0;Ri) > WP ({a, b}, 0;Ri).
Strict decreasing marginal WP requires a minimal degree of submodularity: the marginal
increase in WP (at 0) by adding {a} to {b} is less than adding {a} to ∅. Notice that this
substitutability requirement is only for bundles of size two. Hence, larger bundles may exhibit
complementarity or substitutability. Because of free disposal, for every a, b ∈M , we have
WP ({a, b}, 0;Ri) ≥ max(WP ({a}, 0;Ri),WP ({b}, 0;Ri)).
Hence, strict decreasing marginal WP implies that WP ({a}, 0;Ri) > 0 and WP ({b}, 0;Ri) >
0, i.e., each object is a good in a weak sense (getting an object is preferred to getting nothing
at payment 0).
We point out that unit demand preferences (studied in (Demange and Gale, 1985; Mori-
moto and Serizawa, 2015)) satisfy strict decreasing marginal WP. A preference Ri is called
a unit demand preference if for every S,
WP (S, t;Ri) = max
a∈S
WP ({a}, t;Ri) ∀ t ∈ R+.
9This is true even if this preference does not satisfy positive income effect.
10The result is available on request.
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If Ri is a unit demand preference and objects are goods, then it satisfies strict decreasing
marginal WP. To see this, call every object a ∈ M a real good if WP ({a}, 0;Ri) > 0 at
every Ri. If every object is a real good, then for every a, b ∈M , we see that
WP ({a}, 0;Ri) +WP ({b}, 0;Ri) > max
x∈{a,b}
WP ({x}, 0;Ri) = WP ({a, b}, 0;Ri).
Besides the strict decreasing marginal WP condition, we will also be requiring strict
positive income effect, but only for singleton bundles.
Definition 9 A classical preference Ri satisfies strict positive income effect if for every
a, b ∈M and for every t, t′ with t′ > t, the following holds for every δ > 0:[
({b}, t′) Ii ({a}, t)
]
⇒
[
({b}, t′ − δ) Pi ({a}, t− δ)
]
.
This definition of strict positive income effect requires that if two objects are indifferent then
decreasing their prices by the same amount makes the higher priced (lower income) object
better. This is a generalization of the definition of positive income effect we had introduced
for dichotomous preferences in Definition 6, but only restricted to singleton bundles.11 This
means that for larger bundles, we do not require positive income effect to hold.
We are ready to state the main tightness result with heterogeneous objects.
Theorem 4 Suppose n ≥ 4,m ≥ 2. Let R0 be a heterogeneous demand preference satisfying
strict positive income effect and strict decreasing marginal WP. Consider any domain T
containing DQL ∪ {R0}. Then, no desirable mechanism exists in T n.
We make a quick remark about the statement of Theorem 4.
Remark 1. Though Theorem 4 requires n ≥ 4, a careful look at its proof reveals that we
only need n ≥ 4 if m > 2. If there are only two objects, the impossibility result in Theorem
4 holds with n ≥ 3. This was shown in Example 3 also.
The basic idea of the proof of Theorem 4 is similar to Example 3. With more than two
object (m > 2), we will need at least four agents. The reason is slightly delicate. Notice that
11An alternate definition along the lines of Definition 6 using willingness to pay map is also possible. It
will require decreasing differences of willingness to pay. Formally, a preference Ri satisfies strict positive
income effect if for every t′ > t and for every a, b ∈ M , we have WP ({a}, t′;Ri) > WP ({b}, t′;Ri) implies
WP ({a}, t′;Ri)−WP ({b}, t′;Ri) < WP ({a}, t;Ri)−WP ({b}, t;Ri).
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R0 in the statement of Theorem 4 is an arbitrary preference. As in Example 3, the proof
ensures that three agents compete for two objects, say {a, b}, out of which two agents have
R0 as their preference. With more than two objects, we need a way to ensure that {a, b} are
allocated among these three agents. In the absence of a fourth agent, it is not possible to
ensure that the two agents having R0 preference are not assigned objects outside of {a, b}.
A fourth agent having arbitrarily large willingness to pay for the bundle M \ {a, b} ensures
that.
We do not know if the impossibility result holds for n = 2 or n = 3 when m > 2, but we
conjecture that it does not. ♦
Unlike the negative result in Theorem 1, Theorem 4 does not require the existence of
negative income effect dichotomous preferences. It requires the domain to contain the set
of quasilinear dichotomous preferences and one heterogeneous demand preference satisfying
some reasonable conditions. This negative result parallels a result of Kazumura and Serizawa
(2016) who show that adding any multi-demand preference to a class of rich unit demand
preference gives rise to a similar impossibility. As was explained in Example 3, our proof
exploits the fact that any desirable mechanism must coincide with the GVCG mechanism
in the positive income effect dichotomous domain, and adding any strictly positive income
effect preference to the domain leads to manipulation. In the case of Kazumura and Serizawa
(2016), they add an arbitrary multi-demand preference (which may or may not satisfy posi-
tive income effect) to a domain of unit demand preferences, where the GVCG mechanism is
not desirable. So, neither of the results imply the other and the proof strategies are different.
We now spell out an exact implication of Theorem 4 in a corollary below. Let D+ be
the set of all positive income effect dichotomous preferences (note that DQL ( D+) and U+
be the set of all heterogeneous unit demand preferences satisfying positive income effect (as
argued earlier, unit demand preferences satisfy strict decreasing marginal WP). Then, the
following corollary is immediate from Theorem 4.
Corollary 1 Suppose T = D+ ∪ U+. Then, no desirable mechanism exists on T n.
Theorem 3 shows that the GVCG mechanism is the unique desirable mechanism on D+.
Similarly, Demange and Gale (1985) have shown that a desirable mechanism exists in U+.
This mechanism is called the minimum Walrasian equilibrium price mechanism and collapses
to the VCG mechanism if preferences are quasilinear. Corollary 1 says that we lose these
possibility results if we consider the unions of these two type spaces.
26
4 Related Literature
The quasilinearity assumption is at the heart of mechanism design literature with payments.
Our formulation of classical preferences was studied in the context of single object auction by
Saitoh and Serizawa (2008), who proposed the generalized VCG mechanism and axiomatized
it for that setting. Other such axiomatizations include Sakai (2008, 2013). As discussed, De-
mange and Gale (1985) had shown that a mechanism different from the generalized VCG
mechanism is desirable when multiple heterogeneous objects are sold to agents with unit
demand. Characterizations of this mechanism have been given in Morimoto and Serizawa
(2015), Zhou and Serizawa (2018) and Kazumura et al. (2020b). However, impossibility
results for the existence of a desirable mechanism were shown (a) by Kazumura and Ser-
izawa (2016) for multi-object auctions with multi-demand agents and (b) by Baisa (2020)
for multiple homogeneous object model with multi-demand agents. Social choice problems
with payments are studied with particular form of non-quasilinear preferences in Ma et al.
(2016, 2018). These papers establish dictatorship results in this setting with non-quasilinear
preferences.
Baisa (2016) considers non-quasilinear preferences with randomization in a single object
auction environment. He proposes a randomized mechanism and establishes strategic prop-
erties of this mechanism. Dastidar (2015) considers a model where agents have same utility
function but models income explicitly to allow for different incomes. He considers equilibria of
standard auctions. Samuelson and Noldeke (2018) discuss an implementation duality without
quasilinear preferences and apply it to matching and adverse selection problems. Kazumura
et al. (2020a) discuss monotonicity based characterization of DSIC mechanisms in domains
which admit non-quasilinear preferences. Baisa and Burkett (2019) discuss a model of single
object allocation when bidders have interdependent values and non-quasilinear preferences
with positive income effects. They give necessary and sufficient conditions for the existence
of an ex-post implementable and Pareto efficient mechanism in two settings: (i) where the
auctioneer is the seller; and (ii) the procurement setting, where the auctioneer is the buyer.
In the former setting, their condition requires existence of an ex-post implementable and
Pareto efficient mechanism in a corresponding quasilinear economy. In the latter setting,
they show an impossibility result if the level of interdependence is strong.
The literature on auction design with budget constrained bidders models budget con-
straint such that if an agent has to pay more than budget, then his utility is minus infinity.
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This introduces non-quasilinear utility functions but it does not fit our model because of
the hard budget constraint. For the multi-unit auction with such budget-constrained agents,
Lavi and May (2012) establish that no desirable mechanism can exist – see an extension of
this result in Dobzinski et al. (2012). They prove this result by considering two bidders each
with publicly known budgets and two units. Their result shows an impossibility similar to
ours as long as the public budgets of the bidders are not equal. Their paper also allows
complementary preferences but not of the extreme form seen with dichotomous preferences.
For combinatorial auctions with single-minded and quasilinear preferences, Le (2018)
shows that these impossibilities with budget-constrained agents can be overcome in a generic
sense – he defines a “truncated” VCG mechanism and shows that it is desirable almost
everywhere.
There is a literature in algorithmic mechanism design on combinatorial auctions with
quasilinear but “single-minded” preferences. Apart from practical significance, the prob-
lem is of interest because computing a VCG outcome is computationally challenging but
various “approximately” desirable mechanisms which are computationally tractable can be
constructed (Babaioff et al., 2005, 2009; Lehmann et al., 2002; Milgrom and Segal, 2020).
Rastegari et al. (2011) show that in this model, the revenue from the VCG mechanism (and
any DSIC mechanism) may not satisfy monotonicity, i.e., adding an agent may decrease rev-
enue. Our paper adds to this literature by illustrating the implications of non-quasilinear
preferences.
A Proofs
A.1 Proof of Theorem 1
The proof extends the intuition in Example 1.
Proof : We start by providing two useful lemmas.
Lemma 1 Suppose (f,p) is an individually rational mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Then
for every agent i ∈ N and every R ∈ T n, we have pi(R) = 0 if fi(R) /∈ Si.
Proof : Suppose R is a profile such that fi(R) /∈ Si for agent i. By individual rationality,
(fi(R), pi(R)) Ri (∅, 0). But fi(R) /∈ Si implies that (∅, pi(R)) Ii (fi(R), pi(R)) Ri (∅, 0).
Hence, pi(R) ≤ 0. But no subsidy implies that pi(R) = 0. 
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Lemma 2 Suppose (f,p) is an individually rational mechanism satisfying no subsidy. Then
for every agent i ∈ N and every R ∈ T n, we have 0 ≤ pi(R) ≤ WP (fi(R), 0;Ri).
Proof : If fi(R) /∈ Si, then the claim follows from Lemma 1. Suppose fi(R) ∈ Si. By
individual rationality, (fi(R), pi(R)) Ri (∅, 0) Ii (fi(R),WP (fi(R), 0;Ri)). This implies that
pi(R) ≤ WP (fi(R), 0;Ri). No subsidy implies that pi(R) ≥ 0. 
Consider any three non-empty bundles S, S1, S2 such that S = S1 ∪ S2 and S1 ∩ S2 = ∅.
Consider a profile of single-minded preferences R∗ ∈ (Dsingle)n as follows. Since all the
agents have dichotomous preferences, to describe any agent i’s preference, we describe the
minimal acceptable bundles Smini (i.e., the set of acceptable bundles Si are derived by taking
supersets of each element in Smini ) and the willingness to pay map wi. Preference R∗1 of agent
1 is quasilinear:
Smin1 = {S}, w1(t) = 3.9 ∀ t ∈ R.
Preference R∗2 of agent 2 is:
Smin2 = {S1}, w2(t) = 2 + 3t ∀ t > −
1
2
and w2(t) =
1
2
otherwise
Preference R∗3 of agent 3 is:
Smin3 = {S2}, w3(t) = 2 + 3t ∀ t > −
1
2
and w3(t) =
1
2
otherwise
Preference R∗i of each agent i /∈ {1, 2, 3} is quasilinear:
Smini = {S}, wi(t) =  ∀ t ∈ R,
where  > 0 but very close to zero.
Assume for contradiction that there exists a DSIC, Pareto efficient, individually rational
mechanism (f,p) satisfying no subsidy. We now do the proof in several steps.
Step 1. In this step, we show that at every preference profile R with Ri = R
∗
i for all
i /∈ {2, 3}, we must have S * fi(R) if i /∈ {1, 2, 3}. We know that Smini = {S} for all
i /∈ {2, 3}. Assume for contradiction S ⊆ fk(R) for some k /∈ {1, 2, 3}. Then, S * f1(R). By
Lemma 1, p1(R) = 0. Consider the following outcome:
Z1 = (S, ), Zk = (∅, pk(R)− ), Zj = (fj(R), pj(R)) ∀ j /∈ {1, k}.
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Since preferences of agent 1 and agent k are quasilinear (note that R1 = R
∗
1 and Rk = R
∗
k)
and  is very close to zero, we have
Z1 P1 (f1(R), p1(R) = 0), Zk Ik (fk(R), pk(R)), Zj Ij (fj(R), pj(R)) ∀ j /∈ {1, k}.
Also, the sum of payments in the outcome vector Z ≡ (Z1, . . . , Zn) is
∑
i∈N pi(R). This
contradicts Pareto efficiency of (f,p).
Step 2. Fix a preference Rˆ2 of agent 2 such that Sˆmin2 = {S1} and wˆ2(0) > 1.9. We show
that at preference profile Rˆ = (Rˆ2, R
∗
−2), S * f1(Rˆ). Suppose S ⊆ f1(Rˆ). Then, S1 * f2(Rˆ)
and S2 * f3(Rˆ). By Lemma 1, p2(Rˆ) = 0, p3(Rˆ) = 0. Consider a new outcome vector:
Z1 = (∅, p1(Rˆ)− 3.9), Z2 = (S1, wˆ2(0)), Z3 = (S2, w3(0)), Zj = (fj(Rˆ), pj(Rˆ)) ∀ j /∈ {1, 2, 3}.
By quasilinearity of R∗1, we get Z1 I
∗
1 (f1(Rˆ), p1(Rˆ)). By definition,
Z2 Iˆ2 (∅, 0) Iˆ2 (f2(Rˆ), p2(Rˆ)).
Similarly, Z3 I
∗
3 (f3(Rˆ), p3(Rˆ)). Further, the sum of payments in the outcome vector Z is
p1(Rˆ)− 3.9 + wˆ2(0) + w3(0) +
∑
j /∈{1,2,3}
pj(Rˆ) >
∑
j∈N
pj(Rˆ),
where the inequality used the fact that p2(Rˆ) = p3(Rˆ) = 0 and wˆ2(0) > 1.9, w3(0) = 2. This
contradicts Pareto efficiency of (f,p).
Step 3. Fix any quasilinear preference Rˆ2 of agent 2 such that Sˆmin2 = {S1} and wˆ2(t) =
1.9− δ, where δ ∈ (0, 1.9). We show that at preference profile Rˆ = (Rˆ2, R∗−2), we must have
S ⊆ f1(Rˆ). If not, then by Step 1 and by Pareto efficiency, S1 ⊆ f2(Rˆ) and S2 ⊆ f3(Rˆ).
Now, consider the following outcome Z ′:
Z ′1 = (S, 3.9), Z
′
2 =
(
∅, p2(Rˆ)− (1.9− δ
2
)
)
, Z ′3 = (∅, p3(Rˆ)− 2),
Z ′j = (fj(Rˆ), pj(Rˆ)) ∀ j /∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Note that by Lemma 1, p1(Rˆ) = 0. Hence, using quasilinearity ofR
∗
1, we get (f1(Rˆ), p1(Rˆ) =
0) I∗1 (S, 3.9). Similarly, by quasilinearity of Rˆ2, we get Z
′
2 Pˆ2 (f2(Rˆ), p2(Rˆ)). Also, the sum
of payments in outcome Z ′ is
3.9 + p2(Rˆ)− (1.9− δ
2
) + p3(Rˆ)− 2 +
∑
j /∈{1,2,3}
pj(Rˆ) =
∑
i∈N
pi(Rˆ) +
δ
2
>
∑
i∈N
pi(Rˆ),
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where we used the fact that p1(Rˆ) = 0.
We now prove that (∅, p3(Rˆ) − 2) R∗3 (f3(Rˆ), p3(Rˆ)). For this, let t = p3(Rˆ) − 2. Note
that w(t) ≤ 2 follows from the definition of w and the fact that t ≤ 0 by Lemma 2. This
implies (∅, t) R∗3 (f3(Rˆ), t+ 2) i.e. (∅, p3(Rˆ)− 2) R∗3 (f3(Rˆ), p3(Rˆ))
Hence, we get a contradiction to Pareto efficiency.
Step 4. In this step, we show that at preference profile R∗,
S1 ⊆ f2(R∗), S2 ⊆ f3(R∗),
and
p2(R
∗) = p3(R∗) = 1.9.
Since w2(0) = 2 in preference R
∗
2, by Step 2, S * f1(R∗). By Step 1, S * fi(R∗) for all
i /∈ {1, 2, 3}. By Pareto efficiency, it must be
S1 ⊆ f2(R∗), S2 ⊆ f3(R∗).
Now, assume for contradiction p2(R
∗) > 1.9. Fix a preference Rˆ2 of agent 2 such that
Sˆmin2 = {S1} and p2(R∗) > wˆ2(0) > 1.9. By Step 2, S1 ⊆ f2(Rˆ2, R∗−2). By DSIC, p2(R∗) =
p2(Rˆ2, R
∗
−2). Hence, p2(Rˆ2, R
∗
−2) > wˆ2(0). This is a contradiction to Lemma 2.
Finally, assume for contradiction p2(R
∗) < 1.9. Then, consider any quasilinear preference
Rˆ2 of agent 2 such that Sˆmin2 = {S1} and p2(R∗) < wˆ2(0) < 1.9. By Step 3, S1 * f2(Rˆ2, R∗−2)
and by Lemma 1, p2(Rˆ2, R
∗
−2) = 0. But by reporting R
∗
2, agent 2 gets S1 at a payment less
than wˆ2(0). By quasilinearity of Rˆ2 and the fact that S1 * f2(Rˆ2, R∗−2), she prefers this
outcome to outcome (f2(Rˆ2, R
∗
−2), 0), which is a contradiction to DSIC.
This concludes the proof that p2(R
∗) = 1.9. A similar argument establishes (with Steps
2 and 3 applied to agent 3) that p3(R
∗) = 1.9.
Step 5. We now complete the proof. By Step 4, we know that the outcome at preference
profile R∗ satisfies:
S * f1(R∗), S1 ⊆ f2(R∗), S2 ⊆ f3(R∗),
p1(R
∗) = 0, p2(R∗) = p3(R∗) = 1.9.
Note that by Lemma 1, pj(R
∗) = 0 for all j /∈ {1, 2, 3}.
Now, consider the following outcome: Z ′j = (fj(R
∗), pj(R∗)) for all j /∈ {1, 2, 3} and
Z ′1 = (S, 3.9), Z
′
2 = ({∅},−0.025), Z ′3 = ({∅},−0.025).
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Note that sum of payments in Z ′ is 3.85 > p2(R∗) + p3(R∗) = 3.8.
Agent 1 is indifferent between Z ′1 and (f1(R
∗), p1(R∗)). Agents 2 and 3 are also indifferent
between Z ′i and (fi(R
∗), pi(R∗)). This follows from the fact that (−0.025) + w2(−0.025) =
(−0.025) + w3(−0.025) = 1.9.
This contradicts Pareto efficiency. 
A.2 Proof of Proposition 1
Proof : Fix a dichotomous domain T . For some tL ∈ R, consider the GVCG-tL mechanism
and denote it as (f,p) ≡ (f vcg,tL ,pvcg,tL). We prove the following claim first.
Claim 1 For every agent i ∈ N and for every profile of preferences R ∈ T n, the following
hold:
(fi(R), pi(R)) Ri (∅, tL), (1)
pi(R) = tL if fi(R) /∈ Si, (2)
where Si is the acceptable set of bundles of agent i at Ri.
Proof : The following inequalities follow straightforwardly.
max
A∈X
∑
j∈N
WP (Aj, tL;Rj) ≥ max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)
⇒
∑
j∈N
WP (fj(R), tL;Rj) ≥ max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)
⇒ WP (fi(R), tL;Ri) + tL ≥ max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (fj(R), tL;Rj) + tL = pi(R).
But this implies that(
fi(R), pi(R)
)
Ri
(
fi(R),WP (fi(R), tL;Ri) + tL
)
Ii (∅, tL),
where the second relation comes from the definition of WP .
Suppose fi(R) is not an acceptable bundle at Ri, then (fi(R), pi(R)) Ii (∅, pi(R)). Then,
the relation (1) implies that tL ≥ pi(R). But by construction, pi(R) ≥ tL. Hence, pi(R) = tL
if fi(R) /∈ Si. 
Using Claim 1, we prove each assertion of the proposition.
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Proof of (1). We prove that the GVCG-tL is DSIC. Fix agent i ∈ N , R−i ∈ T n−1, and
Ri, R
′
i ∈ T . Let A ≡ f(Ri, R−i) and A′ ≡ f(R′i, R−i). We start with a simple lemma.
Lemma 3 If Ai and A
′
i belong to the acceptable bundle set at Ri, then
pi(Ri, R−i) ≤ pi(R′i, R−i).
Proof : Note that
pi(Ri, R−i)− pi(R′i, R−i) =
[
max
Aˆ∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aˆj, tL;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)
]
− [max
Aˆ∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aˆj, tL;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, tL;Rj)
]
=
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, tL;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)
= WP (A′i, tL;Ri) +
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, tL;Rj)
−WP (Ai, tL;Ri)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)
=
∑
j∈N
WP (A′j, tL;Rj)−
∑
j∈N
WP (Aj, tL;Rj)
≤ 0,
where the third equality follows from the fact that Ai, A
′
i belong to the acceptable bundle
set at Ri and the last inequality follows from the fact that f(R) = A. 
Let Si be the acceptable bundle set of agent i according to Ri. We consider two cases.
Case 1. Ai ∈ Si. If A′i ∈ Si, then Lemma 3 implies that
(Ai, pi(Ri, R−i)) Ii (A′i, pi(Ri, R−i)) Ri (A
′
i, pi(R
′
i, R−i)).
If A′i /∈ Si, then Equation (2) implies that pi(R′i, R−i) = tL. But, then Inequality (1) implies
that
(Ai, pi(Ri, R−i)) Ri (∅, tL) Ii (A′i, tL).
Case 2. Ai /∈ Si. By Equation 2, pi(Ri, R−i) = tL. Now, note that since Ai /∈ Si, we have
WP (Ai, tL;Ri) = 0, and hence,∑
j∈N
WP (Aj, tL;Rj) = max
Aˆ∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aˆj, tL;Rj).
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This implies that
∑
j∈N
WP (A′j, tL;Rj) ≤
∑
j∈N
WP (Aj, tL;Rj) = max
Aˆ∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aˆj, tL;Rj),
where the first inequality followed from the definition of A. This implies that
WP (A′i, tL;Ri) ≤ max
Aˆ∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aˆj, tL;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, tL;Rj) = pi(R
′
i, R−i)− tL.
This further implies that(
Ai, pi(Ri, R−i)
)
Ii (∅, tL) Ii
(
A′i,WP (A
′
i, tL;Ri) + tL
)
Ri
(
A′i, pi(R
′
i, R−i)
)
.
Hence, in both cases, we see that agent i prefers his outcome (Ai, pi(Ri, R−i)) in the
GVCG mechanism to the outcome obtained by reporting R′i. This concludes the proof that
the GVCG-tL is strategy-proof.
Proofs of (2) and (3). By Inequality (1), for every i ∈ N and for every R, we have(
fi(R), pi(R)
)
Ri (∅, tL). If tL ≤ 0, we get that
(
fi(R), pi(R)
)
Ri (∅, 0), which is individual
rationality. (3) follows from (2).
Proof of (4). We now show that for n = 2, the GVCG-tL mechanism (for any tL ∈ R)
is Pareto efficient in any dichotomous domain. Let N = {1, 2} and consider a preference
profile R ≡ (R1, R2) with S1 and S2 as the collection of acceptable bundles of agents 1 and
2 respectively. We consider two cases. As before, denote by (f,p) ≡ (f,pvcg,tL).
Case 1. There exists S1 ∈ S1 and S2 ∈ S2 such that S1 ∩ S2 = ∅. Then, f1(R) ∈ S1 and
f2(R) ∈ S2 and p1(R) = p2(R) = tL. Denote A∗1 := f1(R) and A∗2 := f2(R). Assume for
contradiction that there is an outcome profile ((A1, p1), (A2, p2)) such that p1 + p2 ≥ 2tL,
(A1, p1) R1 (A
∗
1, tL), and (A2, p2) R2 (A
∗
2, tL) with strict inequality holding for one of them.
By the last two relations, it must be that p1 ≤ tL and p2 ≤ tL with strict inequality hold-
ing whenever these relations are strict, which means that p1 + p2 ≤ 2tL. But this means
p1 + p2 = 2tL since we assumed p1 + p2 ≥ 2tL. Hence, none of the relations can hold strict,
a contradiction.
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Case 2. For every S1 ∈ S1 and for every S2 ∈ S2, we have S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅. Then, one of
the agents in {1, 2} will be assigned an acceptable bundle in f . Let this agent be 1. Hence,
f1(R) ∈ S1 and f2(R) = ∅. Further, p1(R) = w2(tL) + tL, where w2(tL) is the willingness to
pay of agent 2 at tL, and p2(R) = tL.
Denote A∗1 := f1(R) and assume for contradiction that there is an outcome profile
((A1, p1), (A2, p2)) such that p1 + p2 ≥ w2(tL) + 2tL, (A1, p1) R1 (A∗1, w2(tL) + tL), and
(A2, p2) R2 (∅, tL) with strict inequality holding for one of them. Consider the following
two subcases - by our assumption that for every S1 ∈ S1 and for every S2 ∈ S2, we have
S1 ∩ S2 6= ∅, only the following two subcases may happen.
• Case 2a. Suppose A1 ∈ S1 and A2 /∈ S2. Since (A1, p1) R1 (A∗1, w2(tL) + tL) and
(A2, p2) R2 (∅, tL), we have p1 ≤ w2(tL) + tL and p2 ≤ tL. Hence, we have p1 + p2 ≤
w2(tL) + 2tL.
• Case 2b. SupposeA1 /∈ S1 andA2 ∈ S2. Inequality (1) implies (A1, p1)R1 (A∗1, w2(tL)+
tL) R1 (∅, tL). Hence, p1 ≤ tL. Similarly, Inequality (1) for agent 2 implies that
p2 ≤ w2(tL) + tL. Hence, again we have p1 + p2 ≤ w2(tL) + 2tL.
Both the cases imply that p1 + p2 ≤ w2(tL) + 2tL with strict inequality holding if
(A1, p1) P1
(
A∗1, w2(tL) + tL
)
or (A2, p2) P2 (∅, tL).
But we are given that p1 +p2 > w2(tL)+2tL or (A1, p1) P1 (A
∗
1, w2(tL)) or (A2, p2) P2 (∅, tL).
This is a contradiction.
Proof of (5). We show the impossibility for N = {1, 2, 3} and M = {a, b}. The im-
possibility can be extended easily to the case when n > 3 and m > 2 by (i) considering
preference profiles where each agent i has minimal acceptable bundle set Smini ⊆ {a, b} and
(ii) every agent i /∈ {1, 2, 3} has arbitrarily small willingness to pay (at every transfer level)
on acceptable bundles. This is similar as in the proof of Theorem 1.
Fix the GVCG-tL mechanism for some tL ∈ R and denote it as (f,p) ≡ (f vcg,tL ,pvcg,tL).
Consider the following single-minded preference profile (R1, R2, R3) such that
Smin1 = {a},Smin2 = {b},Smin3 = {a, b}.
35
The WP values at transfer level tL are as follows:
WP ({a}, tL;R1) = w1;WP ({b}, tL;R2) = w2;WP ({a, b}, tL;R3) = w3,
such that w1 + w2 > w3 > max(w1, w2). Further, we require R1 and R2 to satisfy the
following: ({a}, w3 − w2 + tL) I1 (∅, tL − ) and({b}, w3 − w1 + tL) I2 (∅, tL − ).
Such dichotomous preferences R1, R2, R3 are possible to construct. Figure 5 illustrates the
some indifference vectors of R1, R2, and R3.
;
fag
fbg
fa; bg
tL
R2
R1
R3
w1
w2
paymentw1
w2
w3
Figure 5: A profile of dichotomous preferences for N = {1, 2, 3} and M = {a, b}.
Hence, the GVCG-tL mechanism produces the following outcome:
f1(R1, R2, R3) = {a}, f2(R1, R2, R3) = {b}, f3(R1, R2, R3) = ∅;
p1(R1, R2, R3) = w3 − w2 + tL, p2(R1, R2, R3) = w3 − w1 + tL, p3(R1, R2, R3) = tL.
Consider the following outcome profile
z1 := (∅, tL − ); z2 := (∅, tL − ); z3 := ({a, b}, w3 + tL).
By construction (see Figure 5), each agent i ∈ {1, 2, 3} is indifferent between zi and (fi(R), pi(R)).
Total transfers in the outcome profile z is: w3 + 3tL − 2. Total transfers in the GVCG-
tL mechanism: 2w3 − (w1 + w2) + 3tL < w3 + 3tL − , where the inequality follows since
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w3 < w1 + w2 and  > 0 is arbitrarily close to zero. Hence, the GVCG-tL mechanism is not
Pareto efficient. 
A.3 Proof of Theorem 2
Proof : By Proposition 1, the GVCG mechanism is DSIC, individually rational, and satisfies
no subsidy. Now, we prove Pareto efficiency. Let T be a dichotomous domain satisfying
positive income effect. Assume for contradiction that there exists a profile R ∈ T n such
that (f vcg(R),pvcg(R)) is not Pareto efficient. As before, let (Si, wi) denote the dichotomous
preference Ri of any agent i. Let f
vcg(R) ≡ A and pvcg(R) ≡ (p1, . . . , pn). Then there exists,
an outcome profile ((A′1, p
′
1), . . . , (A
′
n, p
′
n)) which Pareto dominates ((A1, p1), . . . , (An, pn)).
We consider various cases to derive relationship between pi and p
′
i for each i ∈ N .
Case 1. Pick i ∈ N such that Ai, A′i ∈ Si or Ai, A′i /∈ Si. Dichotomous preference implies
that (A′i, p
′
i) Ii (Ai, p
′
i). But (A
′
i, p
′
i) Ri (Ai, pi) implies that (Ai, p
′
i) Ri (Ai, pi). Hence, we
get
pi ≥ p′i ∀ i such that Ai, A′i ∈ Si or Ai, A′i /∈ Si. (3)
Case 2. Pick i ∈ N such that Ai /∈ Si but A′i ∈ Si. This implies that pi = 0 (by Lemma 1).
Hence, (A′i, p
′
i) Ri (Ai, pi) Ii (Ai, 0) Ii (∅, 0) Ii (A′i, wi(0)). Thus,
wi(0) + pi ≥ p′i ∀ i such that Ai /∈ Si, A′i ∈ Si. (4)
Case 3. Pick i ∈ N such that Ai ∈ Si but A′i /∈ Si. Since A′i /∈ Si, we can write
(A′i, p
′
i) Ii (∅, p′i) Ii (Ai, p′i + wi(p′i)). But (A′i, p′i) Ri (Ai, pi) implies that
pi ≥ p′i + wi(p′i).
Also, (∅, p′i) Ii (A′i, p′i) Ri (Ai, pi) Ri (∅, 0), where the last inequality is due to individual
rationality of the GVCG mechanism. Hence, p′i ≤ 0. But then, positive income effect implies
that wi(p
′
i) ≥ wi(0). This gives us
pi ≥ p′i + wi(0) ∀ i such that Ai ∈ Si, A′i /∈ Si. (5)
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By summing over Inequalities 3, 4, and 5, we get∑
i∈N
pi ≥
∑
i∈N
p′i +
∑
i:Ai∈Si,A′i /∈Si
wi(0)−
∑
i:Ai /∈Si,A′i∈Si
wi(0).
=
∑
i∈N
p′i +
∑
i:Ai∈Si,A′i /∈Si
wi(0) +
∑
i:Ai,A′i∈Si
wi(0)−
∑
i:Ai,A′i∈Si
wi(0)−
∑
i:Ai /∈Si,A′i∈Si
wi(0).
=
∑
i∈N
p′i +
∑
i∈N
WP (Ai, 0;Ri)−
∑
i∈N
WP (A′i, 0;Ri)
≥
∑
i∈N
p′i,
where the inequality follows from the definition of the GVCG mechanism. Also, note that
the inequality above is strict if any of the Inequalities 3, 4, and 5 is strict. This contradicts
the fact that the outcome ((A′1, p
′
1), . . . , (A
′
n, p
′
n)) Pareto dominates ((A1, p1), . . . , (An, pn)).

A.4 Proof of Theorem 3
Proof : Let (f,p) be a Pareto efficient, DSIC, IR mechanism satisfying no subsidy. The
proof proceeds in two steps. We assume without loss of generality that at every preference
profile R, if an agent i ∈ N is assigned an acceptable bundle fi(R), then fi(R) is a minimal
acceptable bundle at Ri, i.e., there does not exist another acceptable bundle Si ( fi(R) at
Ri.
12 We now proceed with the proof in two Steps.
Allocation is GVCG allocation. In this step, we argue that f must satisfy:
f(R) ∈ arg max
A∈X
∑
i∈N
WP (Ai, 0;Ri) ∀ R ∈ T n
Assume for contradiction that for some R ∈ T n, we have∑
i∈N
WP (fi(R), 0;Ri) < max
A∈X
∑
i∈N
WP (Ai, 0;Ri).
12This is without loss of generality for the following reason. For every Pareto efficient, DSIC, IR mechanism
(f,p) satisfying no subsidy, we can construct another mechanism (f ′,p′) such that: for all R and for all
i ∈ N , f ′i(R) ⊆ fi(R) and f ′i(R) is a minimal acceptable bundle at Ri whenever fi(R) is an acceptable bundle
at Ri and f
′
i(R) = fi(R) otherwise. Further, p
′ = p. It is routine to verify that (f ′,p′) is DSIC, IR, Pareto
efficient and satisfies no subsidy. Finally, by construction, if (f ′,p′) is a generalized VCG mechanism, then
(f,p) is also a generalized VCG mechanism.
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Before proceeding with the rest of the proof, we fix a generalized VCG mechanism (f vcg, pvcg)
and introduce a notation. For every R′, denote by
N0+(R
′) :=
{
i ∈ N : [(f vcgi (R′), pvcgi (R′)) I ′i (∅, 0)] and [(fi(R′), pi(R′)) P ′i (∅, 0)]}.
We now construct a sequence of preference profiles, starting with preference profile R,
as follows. Let R0 := R. Also, we will maintain a sequence of subsets of agents, which is
initialized as B0 := ∅. We will denote the preference profile constructed in step t of the
sequence as Rt and the willingness to pay map at preference Rti as w
t
i for each i ∈ N .
S1. If N0+(R
t) \Bt = ∅, then stop. Else, go to the next step.
S2. Choose kt ∈ N0+(Rt)\Bt and consider Rt+1kt to be a quasilinear dichotomous preference
with valuation wt+1kt (0) ∈ (pkt(Rt), wtkt(0)) and a unique minimal acceptable bundle
fkt(R
t) - such a quasilinear preference exists because T ⊇ DQL. Let Rt+1j = Rtj for all
j 6= kt.
S3. Set Bt+1 := Bt ∪ {kt} and t := t+ 1. Repeat from Step S1.
Because of finiteness of number of agents, this process will terminate finitely in some
T < ∞ steps. We establish some claims about the preference profiles generated in this
procedure.
Claim 2 For every t ∈ {0, . . . , T − 1}, fkt(Rt+1) = fkt(Rt) and pkt(Rt+1) = pkt(Rt).
Proof : Fix t and assume for contradiction fkt(R
t+1) 6= fkt(Rt). Since fkt(Rt) is the unique
minimal acceptable bundle at Rt+1kt and f only assigns a minimal acceptable bundle whenever
it assigns acceptable bundles, it must be that fkt(R
t+1) is not an acceptable bundle at Rt+1kt .
Then, by Lemma 1, we get pkt(R
t+1) = 0. Since wt+1kt (0) > pkt(R
t) and fkt(R
t) is an
acceptable bundle at Rt+1kt , we get
(fkt(R
t), pkt(R
t)) P t+1kt (∅, 0) I t+1kt (fkt(Rt+1), pkt(Rt+1)).
This contradicts DSIC. Finally, if fkt(R
t+1) = fkt(R
t), we must have pkt(R
t+1) = pkt(R
t) due
to DSIC since acceptable bundle at Rt+1kt is fkt(R
t) and fkt(R
t) is also an acceptable bundle
at Rtkt . 
The next claim establishes a useful inequality.
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Claim 3 For every t ∈ {0, . . . , T}, the following holds:
wtkt(0) + max
A∈X ,Akt=fkt (Rt)
∑
j 6=kt
WPj(Aj, 0;R
t
j) ≤ max
A∈X
∑
j 6=kt
WPj(Aj, 0;R
t
j).
Proof : Pick some t ∈ {0, . . . , T} and suppose the above inequality does not hold. We
complete the proof in two steps.
Step 1. In this step, we argue that f vcgkt must be an acceptable bundle for agent k
t at
preference Rt. If this is not true, then we must have∑
j∈N
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj) =
∑
j 6=kt
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj)
≤ max
A∈X
∑
j 6=kt
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j)
< wtkt(0) + max
A∈X ,Akt=fkt (Rt)
∑
j 6=kt
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j)
= WP (fkt(R
t), 0;Rtkt) + max
A∈X ,Akt=fkt (Rt)
∑
j 6=kt
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j),
where the last inequality follows from our assumption that the claimed inequality does not
hold and the last equality follows from the fact that fkt(R
t) is an acceptable bundle of agent
kt at Rtkt . But, then the resulting inequality contradicts the definition of f
vcg.
Step 2. We complete the proof in this step. Notice that the payment of agent kt in
(f vcg, pvcg) is defined as follows.
pvcgkt (R
t) = max
A∈X
∑
j 6=kt
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j)−
∑
j 6=kt
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj)
< wtkt(0) + max
A∈X :Akt=fkt (Rt)
∑
j 6=kt
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j)−
∑
j 6=kt
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj)
= wtkt(0) + max
A∈X :Akt=fkt (Rt)
∑
j 6=kt
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j)
−
∑
j∈N
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj) +WP (f
vcg
kt (R
t), 0;Rtkt)
= wtkt(0) + max
A∈X ,Akt=fkt (Rt)
∑
j∈N
WP (Aj, 0;R
t
j)−
∑
j∈N
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj)
≤ wtkt(0),
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where the strict inequality followed from our assumption and the last equality follows from
the fact both fkt(R
t) and f vcgkt (R
t) are acceptable bundles for agent kt at Rtkt (Step 1). But,
this implies that
(f vcgkt (R
t), pvcgkt (R
t)) P tkt (f
vcg
kt (R
t), wtkt(0)) I
t
kt (∅, 0).
This is a contradiction to the fact that kt ∈ N0+(Rt). This completes the proof. 
We now establish an important claim regarding an inequality satisfied by the sequence
of preferences generated.
Claim 4 For every t ∈ {0, . . . , T},∑
j∈N
WP (fj(R
t), 0;Rtj) <
∑
j∈N
WP (f vcgj (R
t), 0;Rtj).
Proof : The inequality holds for t = 0 by assumption. We now use induction. Suppose the
inequality holds for t ∈ {0, . . . , τ − 1}. We show that it holds for τ . To see this, denote
k ≡ kτ−1. By Claim 2, we know that fk(Rτ−1) = fk(Rτ ). Further, by definition, fk(Rτ )
belongs to the acceptable bundle of k at Rτk and R
τ−1
k . Now, observe the following:∑
j∈N
WP (fj(R
τ ), 0;Rτj ) = w
τ
k(0) +
∑
j 6=k
WP (fj(R
τ ), 0;Rτj ) (follows from definition of k)
≤ wτk(0) + max
A∈X :Ak=fk(Rτ−1)=fk(Rτ )
∑
j 6=k
WP (Aj, 0;R
τ
j )
= wτk(0) + max
A∈X :Ak=fk(Rτ−1)=fk(Rτ )
∑
j 6=k
WP (Aj, 0;R
τ−1
j )
(using the fact that Rτj = R
τ−1
j for all j 6= k)
≤ wτk(0)− wτ−1k (0) + max
A∈X
∑
j 6=k
WP (Aj, 0;R
τ−1
j ) (using Claim 3)
< max
A∈X
∑
j 6=k
WP (Aj, 0;R
τ−1
j ) (using the fact that w
τ
k(0) < w
τ−1
k (0))
= max
A∈X
∑
j 6=k
WP (Aj, 0;R
τ
j )
≤ max
A∈X
∑
j∈N
WP (Aj, 0;R
τ
j ).

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We now complete our claim that the allocation is the same as in a GVCG mechanism.
Let RT ≡ R′. Let f vcg(R′) = Avcg and f(R′) = A′. Partition the set of agents as follows.
N++ := {i : WPi(Avcgi , 0;R′i) = WP (A′i, 0;R′i) > 0}
N+− := {i : WPi(Avcgi , 0;R′i) > 0,WP (A′i, 0;R′i) = 0}
N−+ := {i : WPi(Avcgi , 0;R′i) = 0,WP (A′i, 0;R′i) > 0}
N−− := {i : WPi(Avcgi , 0;R′i) = WP (A′i, 0;R′i) = 0}.
Now, consider the following consumption bundle Z:
Zi :=

(Avcgi , pi(R
′)) if i ∈ N++ ∪N−−
(Avcgi , pi(R
′)−WP (A′i, 0;R′i)) if i ∈ N−+
(Avcgi ,WP (A
vcg
i , 0;R
′
i)) if i ∈ N+−
Notice that for each i ∈ N++ ∪N−−, we have Zi = (Avcgi , pi(R′)) I ′i (A′i, pi(R′)). For each i ∈
N+−, we know that WP (A′i, 0;R
′
i) = 0 - this implies that A
′
i is not an acceptable bundle at R
′
i.
Hence, for all i ∈ N+−, we have Zi = (Avcgi ,WP (Avcgi , 0;R′i)) I ′i (∅, 0) I ′i (A′i, pi(R′)), where
the last relation follows from Lemma 1. Finally, for all i ∈ N−+, WPi(Avcgi , 0;R′i) = 0 implies
that (Avcgi , p
vcg
i (R
′)) I ′i (∅, 0). Then, for every i ∈ N−+, either we have (A′i, pi(R′)) I ′i (∅, 0) or
we have i ∈ BT (i.e., R′i is a quasilinear preference). In the first case, pi(R′) = WP (A′i, 0;R′i)
implies
(Avcgi , pi(R
′)−WP (A′i, 0;R′i)) I ′i (Avcgi , 0) I ′i (∅, 0) I ′i (A′i, pi(R′)).
In the second case, quasilinearity of R′i implies (A
vcg
i , pi(R
′)−WP (A′i, 0;R′i)) I ′i (A′i, pi(R′)).
This completes the argument that Zi R
′
i (A
′
i, pi(R
′)) for every i ∈ N .
Now, observe the sum of payments across all agents in Z is:∑
i/∈N+−
pi(R
′)−
∑
i∈N−+
WP (A′i, 0;R
′
i) +
∑
i∈N+−
WP (Avcgi , 0;R
′
i)
=
∑
i∈N
pi(R
′)−
∑
i∈N−+
WP (A′i, 0;R
′
i) +
∑
i∈N+−
WP (Avcgi , 0;R
′
i)
(since A′i is not acceptable, Lemma 1 implies pi(R
′) = 0 for all i ∈ N+−)
=
∑
i∈N
pi(R
′) +
∑
i∈N
WP (Avcgi , 0;R
′
i)−
∑
i∈N
WP (A′i, 0;R
′
i)
>
∑
i∈N
pi(R
′),
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where the last inequality follows from Claim 4.
Hence, Z Pareto dominates the outcome (f(R′), p(R′)), contradicting Pareto efficiency.
We now proceed to the next step to show that the payment in (f,p) must also coincide with
the generalized VCG outcome.
Payment is GVCG payment. Fix a preference profile R. We now know that
f(R) ∈ arg max
A∈X
∑
i∈N
WP (Ai, 0;Ri).
By Lemma 1, for every i ∈ N , if fi(R) = f vcgi (R) is not acceptable for agent i, then
pi(R) = p
vcg
i (R) = 0 - here, we assume, without loss of generality, that f(R
′) = f vcg(R′) for
all R′.13 We now consider two cases.
Case 1. Assume for contradiction that there exists i ∈ N such that fi(R) is an acceptable
bundle of agent i and
pi(R) > max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, 0;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (fj(R), 0;Rj). (6)
Now considerR′i with the set of acceptable bundles the same inRi andR
′
i butWP (fi(R), 0;R
′
i) <
pi(R) but arbitrarily close to pi(R). Let A
′ ≡ f(R′i, R−i). We argue that A′i is an acceptable
bundle (at R′i). If not, then
max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, 0;Rj) ≥
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, 0;Rj) = WP (A
′
i, 0;R
′
i) +
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, 0, Rj),
where we used the fact that A′i is not an acceptable bundle for i. But then, by construction
of R′i and Inequality (6), we get
WP (fi(R), 0;R
′
i)+
∑
j 6=i
WP (fj(R), 0;Rj) > max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, 0;Rj) ≥ WP (A′i, 0;R′i)+
∑
j 6=i
WP (A′j, 0, Rj),
which is a contradiction to our earlier step that f is the same allocation as in the GVCG
mechanism. Hence, A′i is an acceptable bundle at R
′
i. But, then pi(R) = pi(R
′
i, R−i) by
DSIC (since fi(R) is also an acceptable bundle at Ri and the set of acceptable bundles at Ri
13Depending on how we break ties for choosing a maximum in the maximization of sum of willingness to
pay, we have a different generalized VCG mechanism. This assumption ensures that we pick the generalized
VCG mechanism that breaks the ties the same way as f .
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and R′i are the same). Since WP (A
′
i, 0;R
′
i) < pi(R) = pi(R
′
i, R−i), we get a contradiction to
individual rationality.
Case 2. Assume for contradiction that there exists i ∈ N such that fi(R) is an acceptable
bundle of agent i and
pi(R) < p
vcg
i (R) = max
A∈X
∑
j 6=i
WP (Aj, 0;Rj)−
∑
j 6=i
WP (fj(R), 0;Rj).
PickR′i such that the set of acceptable bundles atR
′
i andRi are the same butWP (fi(R), 0;R
′
i) ∈
(pi(R), p
vcg
i (R)). Notice that if fi(R
′
i, R−i) is not an acceptable bundle at R
′
i, then his pay-
ment is zero (Lemma 1). In that case, WP (fi(R), 0;R
′
i) > pi(R) implies that
(fi(R), pi(R)) P
′
i (∅, 0) I ′i (fi(R′i, R−i), pi(R′i, R−i)),
contradicting DSIC. Hence, fi(R
′
i, R−i) = f
vcg
i (R
′
i, R−i) is an acceptable bundle at R
′
i. This
implies that f vcgi (R
′
i, R−i) is an acceptable bundle at R
′
i. Since the generalized VCG is DSIC,
we get that pvcgi (R) = p
vcg
i (R
′
i, R−i). But WP (f
vcg
i (R
′
i, R−i), 0;R
′
i) < p
vcg
i (R) = p
vcg
i (R
′
i, R−i)
is a contradiction to IR of the generalized VCG. This completes the proof. 
A.5 Proof of Theorem 4
Proof : Assume for contradiction that (f,p) is a desirable mechanism on T n. By hetero-
geneous demand, there exist objects a and b such that 0 < WP (a, 0;R0) < WP (b, 0;R0).
Consider a preference profile R ∈ T n as follows:
1. Agent 1 has quasilinear dichotomous preference with Smini = {{a, b}} and value w1(0)
that satisfies
WP ({a, b}, 0;R0) < w1(0) < WP ({a}, 0;R0) +WP ({b}, 0;R0). (7)
2. Ri = R0 for all i ∈ {2, 3}.
3. If m > 2, agent 4 has quasilinear dichotomous preference with acceptable bundle
M\{a, b} and value very high. If m = 2, agent 4 has quasilinear dichotomous preference
with acceptable bundle M and value equals to , which is very close to zero.
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4. For all i > 4, let Ri be a quasilinear dichotomous preference with Smini = {M} and
value equals to , which is very close to zero.
We begin by a useful claim.
Claim 5 Pick k ∈ {2, 3} and x ∈ {a, b}. Let R′ be a preference profile such that R′i = Ri
for all i 6= k. Suppose R′k is such that
WP ({x}, 0;R′k) +WP ({a, b} \ {x}, 0;R0) > w1(0) > WP ({a, b}, 0;R′k). (8)
Then, the following are true:
1. f1(R
′) = ∅
2. f2(R
′) ∪ f3(R′) = {a, b}
3. f2(R
′) 6= ∅ and f3(R′) 6= ∅.
Proof : It is without loss of generality (due to Pareto efficiency) that fi(R
′) = ∅ or
fi(R
′) ∈ Smini for all i who has dichotomous preference. Since  is very close to zero, Pareto
efficiency implies that (a) if m = 2, fi(R
′) = ∅ for all i > 3; and (b) if m > 2, since agent 4
has very high value for M \ {a, b}, f4(R′) = M \ {a, b} and fi(R′) = ∅ for all i > 4. Hence,
agents 1, 2, and 3 will be allocated {a, b} at R′. Denote y ≡ {a, b}\{x} and ` ≡ {2, 3}\{k}.
Proof of (1) and (2). Assume for contradiction f1(R
′) 6= ∅. Pareto efficiency implies
that f1(R
′) = {a, b} and f2(R′) = f3(R′) = ∅. Lemma 1 implies that p2(R′) = p3(R′) = 0.
Then, consider the following outcome:
z1 :=
(
∅, p1(R′)− w1(0)
)
, zk :=
(
{x},WP ({x}, 0;R′k)
)
, z` :=
(
{y},WP ({y}, 0;R′`)
)
,
zi :=
(
fi(R
′), pi(R′)
)
∀ i > 3.
By definition of willingness to pay, zi Ii (∅, 0) ≡
(
fi(R
′), pi(R′)
)
for all i ∈ {2, 3}. Since
agent 1 has quasilinear preferences, she is also indifferent between z1 and
(
{a, b}, p1(R′)
)
≡(
f1(R
′), p1(R′)
)
. Thus, the difference in total payment between the outcome z and the
payment in (f,p) at R′ is
WP ({x}, 0;R′k) +WP ({y}, 0;R′`)− w1(0) = WP ({x}, 0;R′k) +WP ({y}, 0;R0)− w1(0) > 0,
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where the inequality follows from Inequality (8). This is a contradiction to Pareto efficiency
of (f,p). Hence, f1(R) = ∅. By Pareto efficiency, f2(R′) ∪ f3(R′) = {a, b}.
Proof of (3). Now, we show that f2(R
′) 6= ∅ and f3(R′) 6= ∅. Suppose f3(R′) =
∅. Then, f2(R′) = {a, b} and Lemma 1 implies that p3(R′) = 0. We first argue that
p2(R
′) = WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2). To see this, consider a quasilinear dichotomous preference R˜2
with acceptable bundle {a, b} and value equal to WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2). Notice that w1(0) >
WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2) - if k = 2, then this is true by Inequality (8) and if ` = 2, then R′` = R0 sat-
isfies w1(0) > WP ({a, b}, 0;R0) by Inequality (7). Since agents 1 and 2 have the same accept-
able bundle at (R˜2, R
′
−2) but w1(0) > WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2), this implies that (due to Pareto effi-
ciency), f2(R˜2, R
′
−2) = ∅ and p2(R˜2, R′−2) = 0 (Lemma 1). By DSIC, (∅, 0) R˜2 ({a, b}, p2(R′)).
This implies that WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2) ≤ p2(R′). IR of agent 2 at R′ implies WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2) =
p2(R
′).
Next, consider the following outcome
z′k := ({x},WP ({x}, 0;R′k), z′` := ({y},WP ({y}, 0;R′`), z′i := (fi(R′), pi(R′)) ∀ i /∈ {2, 3}.
By definition, for every agent i, z′i I
′
i (fi(R
′), pi(R′)). The difference between the sum of
payments of agents in z′ and (f,p) at R is:
WP ({x}, 0;R′k) +WP ({y}, 0;R′`)− p2(R′) = WP ({x}, 0;R′k) +WP ({y}, 0;R0)−WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2)
> w1(0)−WP ({a, b}, 0;R′2)
> 0,
where the first inequality follows from Inequality (8) and the second inequality follows from
Inequality (8) if k = 2 and from Inequality (7) if ` = 2. This contradicts Pareto efficiency of
(f,p). A similar proof shows that f2(R
′) 6= ∅. 
Now, pick any k ∈ {2, 3} and set R′k = R0 in Claim 5. By Inequality (7), Inequality (8)
holds for R0. As a result, we get that f2(R) 6= ∅, f3(R) 6= ∅, and f2(R) ∪ f3(R) = {a, b}.
Hence, without loss of generality, assume that f2(R) = {a} and f3(R) = {b}.14 We now
complete the proof in two steps.
14Since we have assumed WP ({b}, 0;R0) > WP ({a}, 0;R0), this may appear to be with loss of generality.
However, if we have f2(R) = {b} and f3(R) = {a}, then we will swap 2 and 3 in the entire argument following
this.
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Step 1. We argue that p2(R) = w1(0)−WP ({b}, 0;R0) and p3(R) = w1(0)−WP ({a}, 0;R0).
Suppose p2(R) > w1(0)−WP ({b}, 0;R0). Then, consider the quasilinear dichotomous pref-
erence RQ2 such that the minimum acceptable bundle of agent 2 is {a} and his value v
satisfies
w1(0)−WP ({b}, 0;R0) < v < p2(R). (9)
Now, note that by IR of agent 2 at R, we have
p2(R) ≤ WP ({a}, 0;R0) ≤ WP ({a, b}, 0;R0) < w1(0),
where the strict inequality followed from Inequality (7). Hence, v < w1(0) and w1(0) <
v + WP ({b}, 0;R0) by Inequality (9). Hence, choosing k = 2, x = a and R′k = RQ2 , we
can apply Claim 5 to conclude that f2(R
Q
2 , R−2) ∪ f3(RQ2 , R−2) = {a, b} and f2(RQ2 , R−2) 6=
∅, f3(RQ2 , R−2) 6= ∅. Since RQ2 is a dichotomous preference with acceptable bundle {a},
Pareto efficiency implies that f2(R
Q
2 ) = {a} = f2(R). By DSIC, p2(R) = p2(RQ2 , R−2). But
Inequality (9) gives v < p2(R) = p2(R
Q
2 , R−2), and this contradicts individual rationality.
Next, suppose p2(R) < w1(0)−WP ({b}, 0;R0). Then, consider the quasilinear dichoto-
mous preference RˆQ2 such that the minimal acceptable bundle of agent 2 is {a} and his value
vˆ satisfies
p2(R) < vˆ < w1(0)−WP ({b}, 0;R0). (10)
Now, consider the preference profile Rˆ such that Rˆ2 = Rˆ
Q
2 and Rˆi = Ri for all i 6= 2. We
first argue that f2(Rˆ) = ∅. Suppose not, then by Pareto efficiency, f2(Rˆ) = {a}. By Pareto
efficiency, we have f3(Rˆ) = {b} and f1(Rˆ) = ∅. By Lemma 1, p1(Rˆ) = 0. We argue that
p3(Rˆ) = WP ({b}, 0;R0). To see this, consider a profile Rˆ′ where Rˆ′i = Rˆi for all i 6= 3 and
Rˆ′3 is a quasilinear dichotomous preferences with minimum acceptable bundle {b} and value
equal to WP ({b}, 0;R0) - notice that every agent in Rˆ′ has quasilinear preference. As a result,
Theorem 3 implies that the outcome of (f,p) at Rˆ′ must coincide with the GVCG mechanism.
But w1(0) > vˆ+WP ({b}, 0;R0) implies that f1(Rˆ′) = {a, b} and f2(Rˆ′) = f3(Rˆ′) = ∅. Then,
DSIC implies that (incentive constraint of agent 3 from Rˆ′ to Rˆ) 0 ≥ WP ({b}, 0;R0)−p3(Rˆ).
By individual rationality of agent 3 at Rˆ we get, p3(Rˆ) ≤ WP ({b}, 0;R0), and combining
these we get p3(Rˆ) = WP ({b}, 0;R0).
Now, consider the following allocation vector zˆ:
zˆ1 :=
(
{a, b}, w1(0)
)
, zˆ2 :=
(
∅, p2(Rˆ)− vˆ
)
, zˆ3 :=
(
∅, 0
)
,
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zˆi :=
(
fi(Rˆ), pi(Rˆ)
)
∀ i > 3.
By definition of w1(0), we get that zˆ1 Iˆ1 (∅, 0). Also, since Rˆ2 is quasilinear with value vˆ, we
get (∅, p2(Rˆ)− vˆ) Iˆ2 ({a}, p2(Rˆ)). For agent 3, notice that R3 = R0 and by the definition of
willingness to pay, we get (∅, 0) Iˆ3
(
{b},WP ({b}, 0;R0)
)
. For i > 3, each agent i gets the
same outcome in zˆ and (f,p). Finally, the sum of payments of agents 1, 2, and 3 (payments
of other agents remain unchanged) in zˆ is
w1(0) + p2(Rˆ)− vˆ > p2(Rˆ) + p3(Rˆ),
where the strict inequality follows from Inequality (10) and the fact that p3(Rˆ) = WP ({b}, 0;R0).
This contradicts the fact that (f,p) is Pareto efficient.
Hence, we must have f2(Rˆ) = ∅. By Lemma 1, we have p2(Rˆ) = 0. But since v > p2(R),
we get ({a}, p2(R)) Pˆ2 (∅, 0). Hence, (f2(R), p2(R)) Pˆ2 (f2(Rˆ), p2(Rˆ)). This contradicts
DSIC.
An identical argument establishes that p3(R) = w1(0)−WP ({a}, 0;R0).
Step 2. In this step, we show that agent 2 can manipulate at R, thus contradicting DSIC
and completing the proof. Consider a quasilinear dichotomous preference R¯Q2 where the
minimum acceptable bundle of agent 2 is {b} (note that f2(R) = {a}) and his value v¯ is
WP ({b}, 0;R0). Consider the preference profile R¯ where R¯2 = R¯Q2 and R¯i = Ri for all i 6= 2.
Notice that if we let k = 2, x = b, and R′k = R¯
Q
2 , Inequality (8) holds, and hence, Claim 5
implies that f2(R¯) 6= ∅ and f3(R¯) 6= ∅ but f2(R¯) ∪ f3(R¯) = {a, b}. Hence, Pareto efficiency
implies that f2(R¯) = {b} and f3(R¯) = {a}. Then, we can mimic the argument in Step 1 to
conclude that
p2(R¯) = w1(0)−WP ({a}, 0;R0).
Now, by the definition of willingness to pay,(
{b},WP ({b}, 0;R0)
)
I0
(
{a},WP ({a}, 0;R0)
)
and by our assumption, WP ({b}, 0;R0) > WP ({a}, 0;R0). By subtracting WP ({a}, 0;R0)+
WP ({b}, 0;R0) − w1(0) (which is positive by Inequality (7)) from payments on both sides,
and using the fact that R0 satisfies strict positive income effect, we get(
{b}, w1(0)−WP ({a}, 0;R0)
)
P0
(
{a}, w1(0)−WP ({b}, 0;R0)
)
.
Hence, (f2(R¯), p2(R¯)) P2 (f2(R), p2(R)). This contradicts DSIC. 
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